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ABSTRACT
A general equilibrium approach that integrates the conventional
supply- and demand-oriented approaches to the determination of
city size and output is proposed. Among the prominent features
of the approach are agglomeration economies and diseconomies, in-
dustrial structure of the city, and the interdependence between
cities via migration and trade. The approach is then utilized to
relate economic efficiency to alternative city size distributions
in the nation.
The optimum city size distribution in which potential welfare
levels of all cities are maximized is attained when all cities
become autarkic and of size No, the single-city optimum size.
However, under limited facor mobility, a hierarchical city size
distribution is more likely to emerge in equilibrium. This
latter city size distribution, though suboptimal, represents
mutual benefits for both cities resulting from gains from trade.
Thesis Co-supervisor: Thesis Co-supervisor:
Alan Strout, Ph.D., William Wheaton, Ph.D.,
Senior Lecturer in Associate Professor in
Urban and Regional Planning. Urban and Regional Economics.
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1. INTRODUCTION
With the continuing increase of worldwide urban populations,
the importance of cities in regional and national economic
development has become paramount. Thus, many countries now adopt
urban policies in order to affect the spatial allocation of
populations among cities as a part of their national economic
development planning (Rodwin[1970], Thompson[1972], Reiner and
Parr[1980], Richardson(1981], Renaud[1981]). According to
recent UN reports, eighty-three percent of 114 developing coun-
tries indicated that the spatial distribution of their urban
population was unacceptable (UN[1978, 1980]). The reports also
noted that the reason for such unacceptability was attributed to
a heavy concentration of population in a few large metropolitan
centers caused by migrations from small cities and rural areas.
These countries seem to believe that unchecked market forces give
rise to excessive growth of their largest primate cities, causing
unwanted results such as economic inefficiency, regional in-
equality, political unrest, and the familiar "big city headaches"
such as congestion, pollution, and overburdened infrastructure
and housing.
The emerging concensus among these countries, according to
the reports, is that the uneven spatial distribution of popula-
tion is the main obstacle to overall socioeconomic development.
To the countries, the existence of their largest cities is
reminiscent of economic inefficiency and inequality. In
-6-
practice, therefore, most urban policies have mainly been limited
to alleviating the situation in their biggest cities, either to
direct more public investments into them or to divert people away
from them. Although many countries, such as Brazil, Egypt, and
Mexico, have emphasized regional growth and development in small
and medium size (or "secondary") cities, such efforts seem to
reflect their desire to keep migrants out of large cities, such
as Sio Paulo, Cairo, and Mexico City. Rarely has there been a
serious commitment to develop the biggest city as well as smaller
cities within the context of the national system of cities. What
is lacking is the view that the unit of national urban policies
must be the national economy rather than the city economy.
Aside from the equality consideration, if spatial urban
policies to alter city sizes are needed for national economic
development, one has to question the validity of the current
policies on economic efficiency grounds: can the size containment
of the largest city enhance the economic welfare of its own
citizens and others in the rest of the country? At least two
shortcomings of the current policies can readily be pointed out.
First, a preoccupation only with the biggest city and its size
merely indicates a greater concern for local development than for
national development. By excluding the rest of the country, the
current policies may be blamed for their artificially narrow
areal scope. They also seem to lack an explicit consideration of
the contribution of the biggest city to the national economy.
Second, their focus on the relationship between one city size and
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the economic efficiency and welfare within even that city is mis-
leading. Unless the city exists in isolation, its size and
efficiency are determined in interaction with the rest of the
country. Moreover, a city without being related to the national
size distribution of cities may never identify its size measure.
In absolute terms, for example, Jakarta may be the biggest city
in its country, but not so by Mexican standards. Of course, no
implication regarding the economic efficiency and welfare in
Jakarta, let alone its contribution to the national economy, can
be drawn from its population size alone. The size and efficiency
of a city are a relative concept that can be meaningful only
within the framework of the national system of cities. It is
clear that, unless urban policies are directed toward the na-
tional system of cities, they may not be useful in enhancing na-
tional economic welfare.
However inadequate the current urban policies may be, they
nevertheless seem to reflect the current state of knowledge in
the literature. Although stylized facts such as the rank-size
rule and paradigms such as "concentrated decentralization"
(Rodwin[1961], Alonso(19681) exist, it is surprizing that no
study has analytically dealt with the basic issue: what spatial
allocation of populations among cities is commensurate with na-
tional economic development? Ever since Isard raised the ques-
tion almost three decades ago, it still remains unanswered
(Isard[1956], p. 183).
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In this dissertation, an attempt will be made to address the
issue directly by devising an analytic spatial economic framework
in which the economic efficiency and welfare of a city depend not
only on its own size and internal characteristics, but also on
those of other cities within the nation. It is hoped that this
framework can serve as an analytic basis of national urban
policies in enhancing the overall level of welfare. To this end,
we will develop a spatial general equilibrium urban model in
which cities are viewed as centers of production, consumption,
and trade. Essential elements of the model will include sizes of
cities, industrial composition and production technologies, and
economic interactions of cities via migration and trade. With
the model, it will then be possible to answer the following
related questions. (1) Does an existing size distribution of
cities leave room for welfare improvement, and justify a planned
intervention? (2) If (1) is so, what would be an alternative
size distribution? (3) What would be an available and effective
means of planned intervention in a typical mixed economy?
Following the long tradition in the international trade
literature, the model will emphasize comparative statics and will
be of a 2 by 2 by 2 (factors, industries, and cities) type, with
possible extensions for n-cities where appropriate. In addition
to comparative advantage which is the basis of the standard trade
model, we will incorporate agglomeration economies into our
model. Thus, it represents an expanded interurban version of the
standard international trade model. However, it is well known
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that such differences as absence of tariffs and exchange rate
concerns, greater factor mobility, similarity in tastes and
production technology make the interurban version a unique and
more plausible trade model than the international version under
the usual set of assumptions.
In chapter 2, we will review two representative yet polar
types of urban models regarding the city's output and size deter-
mination. Since both types are incorporated into our model, we
will discuss their merits and shortcomings along with the ra-
tionale of our model specification. The single-city model to be
developed in chapter 3 will be adapted from discussions made in
the previous chapter. It will be the basic tool used throughout
this dissertation. We will show how the city's internal produc-
tion and consumption characteristics, including its size, deter-
mine its welfare level. In chapter 4, we will deal with two
cities that are mutually interdependent in the economy by means
of balanced trade and exchange of factors. Under different
assumptions, equilibrium sizes and welfare levels of both cities
will be determined. We will then examine changes in the equi-
librium welfare levels as a result of changes in the size dis-
tribution of cities. In chapter 5, we will cover, by utilizing
lessons from the previous chapters, some suggestive issues in na-
tional urban policies. Due to the scant nature of economic data
at the city level in most countries, however, we will rely on
numerical analyses rather than on empirical ones. In chapter 6,
we will present the conclusions. After a brief summary of the
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dissertation, we will delineate limitations of our model and
possible directions for future research in urban modelling and
policy making.
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2. MODELS OF CITY SIZE AND OUTPUT DETERMINATION
2-1. Introduction
Before we build a sound urban model, it is necessary to in-
vestigate existing urban models that explain the determination of
city size and output. Since the standard assumption is to equate
city size with city laborers, most models rely on the mechanics
of the urban labor market for explanations. Moreover, since the
number of laborers is highly dependent on net migration into a
city, urban models put a particular emphasis on the relationship
between employment and migration. Two contrasting approaches,
each of which emphasizes either the demand or supply side of the
labor market, will be reviewed. We will then argue that in-
corporation of both views would be necessary to build a spatial
general-equilibrium urban model. In addition, refinement of some
key concepts for our model specification will be noted.
2-2. Demand- and Supply-oriented Models
Muth[1971], Engle[1974], Schaefer[1977], and Miron[1979]
provide a useful classification of urban models on city size and
output: the demand- and supply-oriented approach. The former
type, which can also be labeled as the external approach,
inherits the Keynesian heritage in urban modelling in that the
main emphasis is on exogenous demands from other areas for the
output of the city. Factor supplies (labor and capital) are pre-
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sumed to be perfectly elastic so that factor in-migrations to the
city are limited only by the city's factor demands at given real
factor prices. It is further assumed that the demand for
products is price inelastic and that no matter how much is de-
manded externally, it will be supplied by the city. Spatially,
this implies that the size and output of the city are wholly
determined by its output market areas combined with varying
demand intensities over space. Migration becomes the consequence
of the city's growth rather than the cause of it. City sizes
will be in continuous equilibrium, because migration will always
clear the interurban labor market. The familiar export-base
model and the various urban hierarchy models, such as
Losch[1954], Beckmann[1958J, and Beckmann and McPherson(1970],
belong to this type.
Although there is a consideration in this approach of
mututal interdependence among cities via exports and factor ex-
change, and, to a varying degree, of their locations and associ-
ated transport costs, it usually does not take account of the
city's internal production and consumption characteristics. In
Beckmann's model, for example, per capita consumption of a good
is held to one unit regardless of its price. With no explicit
consideration of comparative costs in production, in particular,
the selection of export sectors becomes rather arbitrary. The
level of exports is often exogenously determined, but there is a
complete lack of explanation as to how the level of imports is
determined. This approach essentially envisions a hierarchy of
-13-
cities based on trade imbalance. Goods are exported only down
the hierarchy from large to smaller cities, but there are no
corresponding reverse flows. In spite of such criticisms of the
demand-oriented approach, it is to its credit that, unlike the
supply-oriented approach, establishment of a city size
distribution, albeit unsatisfactory, is feasible within the
model.
The supply-oriented, or internal approach, on the other
hand, is often concerned with one city in isolation, and repres-
ents the tradition in the international trade literature. The
main focus of this approach is on the city's production technol-
ogy, endowment of factors, and other internal characteristics.
It is often assumed that factor demands are perfectly price
elastic, but factor supplies are inelastic due to non-wage
considerations. Further, since the city is presumed to face a
perfectly elastic export demand at a given output price (or terms
of trade), it is suggested that no matter how much the city
produces, it will be purchased elsewhere. This is the familiar
"small country approximation" in the international trade litera-
ture. Consequently, the output and size of the city are limited
only by the internal cost consideration and available factor
supplies. Migration now becomes the cause of the city's growth,
rather than the response of it. Thus, the city's internal char-
acteristics (including non-wage aspects), which presumably are a
determinant for potential migrants, become of paramount
importance for its growth.
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In this approach, an exogenous shock, for example, to shift
the demand for labor will induce migration into the city, and
this will in turn result in an even greater equilibrium city size
and output. This "growth-feeds-by-itself" hypothesis has been
suggested by many authors including Borts and Stein[1964],
Thompson[1968], and Muth(1971]. Although this approach
emphasizes the city's various internal characteristics in
production and consumption, its neglect of other cities as both
output market and factor supply areas make it highly unrealistic
as a basis of a spatial urban model. In general, due to its lack
of the explicit linkage among cities, this approach cannot
establish a distribution of city sizes endogenously. However,
since this approach has been influential in the literature and
pervasive in the minds of many governments, as it incorporates
the concept of agglomeration economies, we will now look into it
further.
2-3. Localization and Urbanization Economies
Following the usual Heckscher-Ohlin practice of constant
returns to scale production technology, proponents of the pure
supply-oriented approach try to find the raison d'Stre of the
city in its resource endowment (natural resources included) that
gives rise to its comparative advantage. However, the approach
is generally extended to contend that when a city is assumed to
be built on homogeneous land, the main economic justification for
-15-
the city is the presence of agglomeration economies in production
and/or consumption. After Ohlin[1933], Hoover[1937] and
Isard[1956], it is widely accepted that agglomeration economies
can be realized at the firm (scale economies), the industry (lo-
calization economies), and the city level (urbanization econ-
omies) (for example, see Isard[1956]). In the urban context,
however, the last two types of agglomeration economies, which are
external to the firm, get the most attention. This is because in
a city multiple firms of widely different sizes seem to coexist
competitively within the same industry. Under the existence of
external economies, therefore, firms are usually modelled to
operate under constant returns to scale and to behave competi-
tively (Kemp[1955,1964], Melvin[1969], Chipman[1970]).
Localization economies, which represent immobile external
economies to the firms of each industry, are internal to the in-
dustry of the city. They are the result of the enlargement of
one industry, which facilitates greater intra-industry spe-
cialization and division of labor in that industry. The enlarge-
ment of the industry also means enhanced intra-industry facili-
ties for the firms in terms of collective research, marketing,
communication, and innovation. Urbanization economies, which are
external to both the firm and the industry but internal to the
city, are the result of greater spatial concentration of all in-
dustries and their increased level of economic activities within
the city. These economies reflect all tangible and intangible
locational advantages for any firm of any industry in a large and
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diverse city economy. Such advantages result from a large city-
wide labor market, a well-developed infrastructure, and other
public facilities, which are often lacking in a smaller, less
diverse place. Thus, the sizes of industries, their composition,
and inter-industry externalities are all implied to be the com-
ponents of urbanization economies of the city. The usual prac-
tice of using the city size alone amounts only to a proxy measure
of urbanization economies, however.
Mills[1967] was among the first formally to present an
analytic supply-oriented model that incorporates urbanization
economies in the production function of a single composite urban
good. In his monocentric city where firms are located in the
city center surrounded by residential areas, a unique equilibrium
size is reached by a sharp increase of commuting costs and con-
gestion (urbanization diseconomies) after certain city sizes are
attained. The equilibrium city size represents an optimum size
at which net urbanization economies (urbanization economies less
diseconomies) are maximized. The equilibrium is essentially an
autarkic one, and the optimum city size is determined entirely by
the internal conditions of the city, regardless of the size dis-
tribution of cities in the rest of the country. Because the city
is of the aforementioned "one-city-in-isolation" type, and its
industrial composition is singular (i.e., city with one aggregate
industry), however, the equilibrium city size should mean either
of two paradoxical results: there is one city in the country; or
all cities are identical. Of course, the naivety of one
-17-
universal optimum city size is well known.
An indirect way to sidestep the above dilemma, while staying
within the Mills' framework, would be to specify a range of
"efficient" city sizes in which net urbanization economies are
positive (Alonso[1971], Richardson[1972]). However, efficiency
here refers to neither an optimum nor an equilibrium, and the
preoccupation here is to find city sizes for "self-sustaining
growth". A more direct solution to avoid the above paradox of
one efficient city size, however, is Henderson's recognition that
different-sized monocentric cities perform different functions,
and they may operate at different, but efficient, equilibrium
sizes (Henderson[19741). Each city, producing only one distinct
export good, is engaged in free trade with other cities (but not
with cities of its own type, the type being determined by the
industry) at exogenously determined terms of trade. Thus, multi-
ples of different-sized cities can coexist in equilibrium;
however, cities of the same type must be identical in size.
It should be noted that Henderson's model is established,
rather a priori, on complete specialization of cities at all
times in which no distinction can be drawn between the city and
the (export) industry (or between urbanization economies and lo-
calization economies). The sizes of both are identical when
measured by laborers. According to this model, a city, however
big it may be, must always be engaged in trade, and unlike the
standard trade model, factor movements can never substitute for
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trade. Henderson notes that complete specialization occurs when
there are no prodution benefits or positive externalities from
locating two different industries in the same place (i.e., the
city center).
If they are located together, because workers in
both industries are living and commuting in the
same city, this raises the spatial area of the
city and average commuting costs for a given
degree of scale economy exploitation in any one
industry. ... Thus, specialized cities will be
larger and more efficient than potential non-spe-
cialized cities; and they will be able to pay
higher factor returns (Henderson (1980], p.17).
However, the statement is premature, and cannot explain even
the initial identification of the export sector. Thus, its com-
plete specialization is totally unclear. The complete spe-
cialization is rather the result of Henderson's reliance on the
so-called small city approximation in which the city produces
(and consumes) on such a small scale that the effect of its
production (and consumption) on the national and international
markets can be ignored. With no consideration given to other
cities as potential market areas, therefore, the complete spe-
cialization is presumed to be feasible. Of course, the identifi-
cation and the degree of specialization of the export sector must
be determined by production and trade equilibrium conditions, not
-19-
a priori. Although complete specialization is always a
possibility, the actual degree of specialization is to be limited
by the extent of the market. In light of the fact that the con-
temporary urban concern stems mainly from the alleged gigantism
of the largest cities and their pervasive effects on national
economies, the small city approximation seems particularly in-
appropriate.
Aside from inter-industry production externalities, the
possibility of multiple industries in the city is more a rule
than an exception. Later we will show that even under external
economies, the production possibility curve of the city is
generally concave. Thus, there exists a rare possibility of com-
plete specialization by one industry. This is because, to the
extent that the marginal products of factors are finite and dim-
inishing even under scale economies, greater specialization by
the city in a particular good will eventually increase the
marginal (social) opportunity cost of that good. Although the
specific degree of specialization by the city cannot be inferred
in the absence of the production functions, even a casual
observation will hold that incomplete specialization is more
likely in a large market such as the city. Moreover, as the
"home market effect" of the trade literature suggests, it can be
argued that the city's size of the internal market determines the
range of goods produced, or industrial diversity. Indeed,
industrial diversity or "breadth", to quote Thompson[19681, must
be a fundamental characteristic of the city.
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It is thus not surprizing to note that the single-industry
models of Mills and Henderson generate rather unrealistic
results. Quite contrary to Henderson's prediction, for example,
Dixit[1973], in an exercise of such a single-industry model,
could not reach an equilibrium city size much in excess of one
million, however large the assumed urbanization economies might
be. Moreover, the existence of a single industry implies that
the output will not respond to a change in price (or the terms of
trade). Such a rigidity can usually be avoided once multiple in-
dustries are allowed for in the city.
For example, Isard[1956] presents a hypothetical illustra-
tion of multiple industries which are subject to urbanization
economies and diseconomies as in Fig. 2-1. It shows four curves
for the corresponding representaive industries of the city in
which net economies increase first, attain maxima, and finally
decrease as city size increases. The top "total economies" curve
is meant to represent an overall net economies figure for the
city, hopefully after apppropriate weighting of the industry
curves. The total economies curve is akin to the single industry
curve implied by the models of Mills and Henderson, but with two
different possibilities: outputs can now become price-elastic;
and industrial composition can play a role in determination of
the equilibrium city size. Thus, the rigidity problem can now be
nicely worked out.
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Fig. 2-1: Hypothetical Economies of Scale with Urban Size.
Source: Isard[1956], p. 187.
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Implicit in depiction of Fig. 2-1 are the usual assumptions
of the supply-oriented approach, however. In particular, the
curves drawn reflect either the autarkic situation of the hypo-
thetical city, or no consideration of other cities in determina-
tion of the national system of cities. It is clear the curves
will change readily once the city becomes interdependent with
other cities via trade, for example.
2-4. Synthesis
The previous section has shown that the two polar types of
urban models attribute city size and output determination mainly
to one of two sources: either external demand for the city's
output or internal characteristics of the city including
agglomeration economies. In view of reality, however, it is
abundantly clear that a truly general spatial urban model calls
for an integration of both. For the size of the city, its
output, and welfare level are all dependent on those of other
cities within the nation. 1 In particular, there is a need to in-
corporate into our model some refinement of the production condi-
tions typified by the supply-oriented approach, as well as the
consideration of demand for the city's output of either internal
or external origin indicated by the demand-oriented approach.
1 International trade, an important factor in urban modelling, is
beyond the scope of this study.
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The single-industry, single-city models of Mills and
Henderson nevertheless represent an improvement over the pure
supply-oriented models in that they incorporate both urbanization
economies and diseconomies albeit in less than satisfactory ways.
However, their failure to allow for industrial diversity within
the city seems to generate inconsistencies as noted above. It
should also be noted that unless the industrial composition of
the city is known, no efficiency implication can be drawn by the
city size alone. This suggests that at least two industries must
be introduced to allow for a meaningful industrial composition
and the consequent agglomeration economies realized within the
city.
Once the existence of, say, two industries is accepted,
there remains the problem of specifying urbanization and lo-
calization economies within the model. Despite deliberations
made by Hoover and Isard, however, the relationship between the
two agglomeration economies that are external to the firm does
not seem well established. As Isard aptly notes, "only a fine
line of distinction" separates them. Although their conceptual
differences have already been noted, their separate specifi-
cations within the model seem to be an intractable problem.
Further work in this area is badly needed. Consequently, we will
handle this problem by the following simplified, but reasonable,
set of assumptions.
First, we envision the existence of a single homogeneous
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labor market from which labor is allocated between the two in-
dustries. The size increase of the labor market along with its
greater spatial concentration would enhance its efficiency and
allow for a greater potential realization of localization econ-
omies for both industries. On the production side, this is made
possible by the increased intra-industry specialization resulting
from the greater division of labor within each industry. On the
consumption side, the potential can be realized, because the
bigger labor market means increased internal demands for the
outputs of both industries.
Second, instead of introducing urbanization economies separ-
ately, we assume that they are the result of localization econ-
omies. Thus, urbanization economies are presumed to consist of
localization economies only. Although this assumption excludes
the possibility of inter-industry production externalities, it is
argued that this nevertheless generates a conceptually more sound
measure of urbanization economies than most measures based on the
city size alone. Like Isard's industry curves of Fig. 2-1, this
assumption will generate localization economies curves of the two
industries. Unlike Isard's model in which the lack of a weight-
ing function precludes measurement of urbanization economies at
the city level, however, our model will generate a measure of
them which is a weighted transformation of the two localization
economies curves. The measure will be in utility terms, and it
will reflect not only the city size but also the underlying in-
dustrial composition of the city in equilibrium. A typical
-25-
phenomenon of urbanization economies, as will be shown later,
will be rising real wages and/or falling prices of goods. In the
following chapter, we will discuss in detail a single-city model
that incorporates the above points.
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3. A SINGLE-CITY MODEL
3-1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to formulate under specific
assumptions a spatial general equilibrium model of a single city,
which is engaged in both production and consumption under
autarky. Under the assumptions that the two industries of the
city experience localization economies and that the city exper-
iences consequent urbanization economies and diseconomies, we
will show how a unique equilibrium is obtained under a perfectly
competitive setting. In the end, real wages, capital rentals,
outputs and their prices, and the level of welfare are all deter-
mined endogenously, given the resource endowments and the pre-
vailing internal production and consumption characteristics of
the city. The fact that the equilibrium is attained totally by
the internal characteristics puts this single-city model in the
tradition of the supply-oriented approach. Later in this
chapter, however, we will allow two cities of the nation to be
engaged in factor exchange but not in trade. This will present
us with a city size distribution which largely reflects the ex-
tension of the supply-oriented approach. A complete balanced-
trade model will be the subject of the next chapter.
To build our single-city model, we will envision a hypothe-
tical city based on the following characteristics and assump-
tions. More specific assumptions will follow in later sections
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which will cover the equilibrium among consumers, producers, and
markets.
a. By city, in general, it is meant that: geographically a
homogeneous monocentric area the center of which is occupied
by the point Central Business District (CBD) for firms,
surrounded by residential areas; and economically the place
where its people live and work. 1 In the single-city model
in particular, the absence of interurban trade requires that
the output market area be limited to that within the city.
b. The city "produces" one nontraded good, housing or land, for
residential use only, and it produces two goods for own con-
sumption and possible interurban trade. Of course, in the
single-city case, trade is denied.
c. The city is spatial in that housing is differentiated by its
distance from the city work center (CBD), and its rents are
determined accordingly. The prices of the two goods are
assumed to be invariant within the city, and they are the
same as the FOB prices. In trade, we also assume that they
are not subject to transport costs for deliveries from one
city center to another.
1 This highly simplified definition is based on the additional
assumption that the city has its unequivocal members as both re-
sidents and workers. In reality, the situation is closer to what
Alonso[1971] calls a "fuzzy set" in which membership is not un-
equivocal but a matter of degree.
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d. Except for their actual housing locations, city residents
are assumed to be identical in all other respects including
location preferences: for example, skills, utility func-
tions, vocational preferences, and capital ownership. Con-
sequently, no distinction exists between workers and capi-
talists, and the usual distributional considerations between
them are avoided. The city land is collectively owned by
them, and each has an equal share in that collective
ownership (i la land bank). Thus, total housing rents are
to be equally divided among residents.
e. The two industries employ two homogeneous factors, labor and
capital, which are both fully employed and fully mobile
between the industries within the city. We also assume that
firm sizes within an industry are identical.
f. All firms in the same industry share an identical production
function, but those between industries are different.
The above list of assumptions is fairly traditional in that
it depicts the requirements of resource ownership among citizens,
and of perfect competition in the city in both output and factor
markets. The special nature of housing, which is produced solely
with land, deserves further clarification, however. Being a per-
fectly localized nontradable good, the prices of housing and the
associated commuting costs are uniquely determined within the
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city. Locational equilibrium for identical residents requires
that the combined costs for housing and commuting be the same re-
gardless of location. By specifying per capita consumption of
housing as unity, we may view the combined costs roughly as a
fixed cost of living unique to the city. Rather than treating
housing and commuting as the objects of utility and disutility
respectively as in Alonso[1964], we can thus simplify the combin-
ed costs as an "admission cost" for any resident to live in the
city. Because the increase of city size would push up the cost,
it can be the measure of urbanization diseconomies in our model.
3-2. Consumer Equilibrium
Suppose there are N residents in the city, each with the
following individual utility function, u, which incorporates the
fixed housing consumption set to unity and the fixed demand for
leisure:
u = x ,x6 2, (3.1)1 2
sie2>0, +92=1'
where xi = individual consumption of good i, (i=1,2). We norma-
lize to unity the fixed amount of total available time after
leisure. The representative resident then will allocate it
between work and commuting as in the following:
I(t) + gt 2 = 1, Ostim, (3.2)
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where 1(t) = labor supply at location t,
g = a technologically determined commuting parameter,
gt 2 = time spent for commuting at location t,
m = distance of the city boundary from the center.
Consequently, although the demand for leisure is fixed, the
supply of labor is variable with respect to location. For
example, residents in the center, who spend no time in commuting,
spend as much time for work as those in the boundary do for work
and commuting, i.e., 1(0)=I(m)+gm 2 . Thus, time preference for
either commuting or work is the same. The commuting time func-
tion, gt 2 , is based on a plausible premise that the marginal com-
muting time is increasing with respect to distance. This is es-
pecially plausible when congestion is a realistic possibility in
the modern city. 2 In terms of its cost, we assume that at lo-
cation t, commuting costs the resident the foregone wage of wgt 2
where w is the wage rate. While this assumption explicitly con-
siders the time aspect of commuting, it neglects the direct out-
of-pocket cost and other psychic costs observed in reality.
However, the assumption considerably simplifies our model in that
2 Although our choice here of a quadratic function, gt 2 , is
arbitrary, it is one way of introducing congestion into the city
at the individual level. Under no congestion, the speed of a
trip must be constant regardless of location. With congestion,
however, it must decrease. For example, with a more general com-
muting time function, gtP, the speed for a one-way trip is
defined as dt/d(gtP)=(1/pg)(t'~P). In order for it to decrease,
0 must be greater than 1. Thus any number greater than 1 can be
used for p. The use of 2 for p, however, considerably simplifies
our derivation of the labor supply function (3.17) to follow.
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it does not require the introduction of a separate transportation
sector into the city. Thus, the economic consequence of commmut-
ing, or of urbanization diseconomies, is simply a waste of some
of the total available labor for the city as a whole.
The utility function is to be maximized subject to the
following budget constraint:
pi + p + p (t) - wI(t) - I = 0, (3.3)
where pi = price of good i (i=1,2),
ph(t) = price of housing service (rent) at location t,
I = nonwage Income.
Aside from location, residents will set the marginal utilities of
the two goods proportionally to their respective prices, yielding
the following individual demand functions:
pix. = 6.[wI(t) + I - p h(t) (i=1,2). (3-4)
Substituting (3.2) and (3.4) into (3.1), we get the indirect
utility function,
V = (6 /p )91(6 /p )62[w(1-gt2 ) + I - ph(t)]. (3.5)
1 1 2 2
Spatial equilibrium in the housing market requires that
ov/8t=0. Differentiating (3.5), it turns out that
aph(t)/at = -2wgt. (3.6)
Thus, at any location, increased foregone wages due to increased
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commuting distance must just be offset by reduced rents, thereby
leaving everyone indifferent as to location. Integrating the
above, with the added assumption that ph(m)=O, or at the city
edge the rent is zero, 3 to determine the constant of integration,
we can derive the following rent gradient, or the price of
housing service at location t:
Ph(t) = wg(m - t ). (3.7)
With per capita housing consumption fixed at unity, the city
boundary will be determined by the following equation:
im = N, (3.8)
where N = population of the city. Given (3.8), we can rewrite
the rent gradient that clears the housing market:
Ph(t) = wg(N/i - t 2). (3.9)
We are now ready to calculate per capita nonwage income, I,
as a last step to determine per capita income. First, there is
the rent income originating from the equal housing share provi-
sion. In our monocentric city, total housing rents are defined
3 Since at the city edge urban rent is zero, this assumes that
the opportunity cost of land in nonurban use is zero too.
However, the outcomes of our model do not change even if we adopt
a positive value for the opportunity cost. This is because the
increase by that much of rent payments is exactly matched by the
increase in rent incomes, leaving any resident with constant
after-rent incomes.
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as
m
R = 2a 0tph(t)dt. (3.10)
Using (3.8) and (3.9), R and the per capita amount, R/N, become
2
R = wgN RwgN (3.11)2i ' N 2x
The remaining nonwage income comes from capital rentals. Under
the equal capital ownership, per capita capital rental income is
r !' , (3.12)
where r = capital rental, K = capital stock in the city.
It is to be emphasized that with variable labor supply, the term
K/N denotes the amount of per capita capital, not the usual
capital-labor ratio of the city. Combining (3.11) and (3.12),
per person nonwage income is
= wgN + rK (3.13)
Substituting (3.2), (3.9), and (3.13) into (3.4), we can
rewrite the individual demand functions in order to determine
equilibrium conditions for the residents as
p.= we. 1 - gN + rK(i,2). (3.14)i 1 21 wN)
Of course, the market demand functions are obtained by aggregat-
ing the above across the N individuals:
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piX = w N 1 -2 + (i=1,2), (3.15)
where Xi = total (market) demand for good i. The bracketed term
of either (3.14) or (3.15) indicates per capita income after the
housing rent adjustment deflated by the wage rate. We now have
obvious consumer equilibrium conditions: the proportion of the
resident's income allocated to good i is equal to Gi.
The same substitution into (3.5) leads to an updated indirect
utility function:
v = 9 192(WJ -_ gN + . (3.16)
Housing location, t, is no longer an argument in (3.16), and in-
dividuals, regardless of location, derive the same level of
welfare. With K/N fixed, or when capital and city population are
changing in the same proportion, utility becomes a linearly
decreasing function of N. This is what we have expected with the
introduction of urbanization diseconomies alone. In the next
section where the production sector of the city is concerned,
urbanization economies will be introduced, and a more complete
picture will subsequently emerge.
Although it has almost become self-evident by now, we now
proceed to calculate the city-wide labor supply, L, for later
use. In the monocentric city, it is defined to be:
-35-
m
L = 2w1 t (t)dt. (3.17)
Substituting (3.2) and (3.8) into (3.17),
2L = N - gN . (3.18)
Out of the total available time after leisure, N, or the city
size, gN 2 /2w is spent on commuting, leaving the city with the
above for L. The ratio of labor to population, L/N, decreases as
city size increases. The labor supply function (3.18) is a quad-
ratic function the relevant portion of which is limited, of
course, to the rising part of it (see Fig. 3-1). For example,
point A in Fig. 3-1 is the hypothetical extreme city size at
which residents at the city edge would have to allocate all of
their time to commuting and none to work. More practical limits
to N are in order.
Since population density in housing is modelled to be
uniform throught the city, and since the parameter g is assumed
to be invariant across city sizes, the upper bound of N is
entirely determined by the situation of the person at the city
edge. That is, one must be able to trade off the lower housing
rent at that location against the increased commuting time and
the consequent reduction in wage. Two reasonable behavioral
assumptions are in order. We assume that on a daily basis each
person sets asides 12 hours for leisure (including sleeping and
other necessary daily routines) and another for work and commut-
' I
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ing the latter of which is normalized to unity for the labor
unit. We further assume that the round-trip commuting time for
the resident at the edge is likely to be limited to no more than
6 hours. From (3.2) and (3.8), this means
0 < N < , (3.19)2g
and from (3.18),
o < L < (3.20)8g
which require that the curve of Fig. 3-1 be limited to the
portion OB. Thus, at the largest practical city size, NB, for
example, the city would lose 1/4 of the total available time to
commuting. According to our model, if cities are endowed with
equal capital per capita, K/N, large cities will have higher
capital-labor ratios, K/L, than smaller ones. This is the direct
consequence of urbanization diseconomies and the other assump-
tions made for this model.
3-3. Producer Equilibrium
In the city, there are two industries, each producing a dis-
tinct homogeneous good by using two homogeneous factors, labor
and capital. The production function of the jth firm in the ith
industry is specified to be
-38-
Y.. = A.LiK..ai, (i=1,2) (j=1,2,...,k.), (3.21)
13 1 1J 1J
0<a.<1, A.i>0,
1 1
where: Yij = output of firm j, industry i,
Lij = labor employed by firm j, industry i,
Kij = capital employed by firm j, industry i,
ki = number of firms in industry i.
Given that all firms within each industry are identical in size
and technology, the firm production functions can be aggregated
into the industry production function,
Y. = K ai, (i=1,2), (3.22)
1 11 1
where: Yi = output of industry i,
Li, Ki = labor, capital of industry i.
Into the industry production function, localization econ-
omies, or what Chipman[1970] calls "parametric external economies
of scale", are introduced by Ai. According to this specifi-
cation, the term Ai is viewed by the firm as a parameter, or a
Hicks neutral shift factor in making its business decisions.
Because the remaining elements of (3.21) constitute a homo-
geneous-of-degree-one production function, the collective be-
havior of the firms assures that the industries have constant-
returns-to-scale production functions. This guarantees the ex-
haustion of total revenues by factor payments. Thus the ex-
istence of localization economies is consistent with perfect com-
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petitition.
Although the term Ai is external to the firm, it is internal
to the industry, and is actually related to the ith industry's
output as in the following:
A. = Y<i, 0<.1, (i=1,2). (3.23)
1 1 1
This specification4 conforms to our previous observation: lo-
calization economies result from the advancement of industry
output which, under spatial proximity of firms within the city,
facilitates division of labor and intra-industry specialization.
When (3.23) is substituted into (3.22), we obtain
Y ~ _i LaiIK ~i, or Y. =LiKJ1-ai Pi, (3.24)
1 1 1 1 ~1 1
P. = 1 , p >1, (i=1,2).
The industry production function of (3.24) is homogeneous of
degree pi. With pi>1 due to localization economies, it will
actually exhibit increasing returns to scale. According to
Chipman, this is called the "objective" production function,
whereas that of (3.22) is called the "subjective" production fun-
ction. The essential difference is that while the former is
based on actual production properties, the latter is based on
4 For a similar specification of external economies of scale, see
Kemp[1955,1964], Melvin[1969], and Chipman[1970], among others.
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entrepreneural behavior. Not only is the term Ai external to the
firms, but the relation (3.23) is assumed to be unknown to them.
As we shall see later, the determination of competitive equi-
librium in the presence of localization economies requires the
use of both.
According to the first-order conditions for profit maximiza-
tion, the reward to each factor is the value of its marginal
product to the firm, not to the industry. For such an
entrepreneural decision, therefore, we compute the marginal
private, or "subjective" products of labor and capital from
(3.21), or (3.22) in the aggregate , holding Ai constant:
1Y K. 1-a Y K.1-a.L ' K 1-a ) 1 (3.25)
Substituting (3.22) into (3.25) for the elimination of Ai, we
obtain
aY 
K Jp(1-ai) 
Y I8L. 1 1 ai -- ,
aY ,_ K 1p(1-ai)-1
aK. (1~ i=)L = (1-a ) K . (3.26)
11
It is to be noted that the above marginal private products
of factors become less than the marginal social or "objective"
products below, which can be computed directly from (3.24), by a
factor of pi:
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dy. Y.
L= pi1i L'PL ii Li
dy. Y.
8K i K.
1 ~ i1
Naturally, we assume that all marginal products are positive,
finite, diminishing, and smaller than the average products. 5
From (3.24), (3.26), and (3.27), this requires additional con-
straints on pi as follows:
p.a. <1,1 1 (3.28)
Under perfect
capital rental, r,
(3.26), therefore,
librium conditions
outputs:
competition, a uniform wage rate, w, and
must prevail between the industries. From
we arrive at the following producer equi-
in which the factor payments exactly meet the
= ai--JY, K = (1-a i) ( lyi. (3.29)
The above producer equilibrium conditions can now be used to
reveal the actual production properties via the marginal private
cost curve, or the industry supply curve. Combining the objec-
tive production function (3.24) and (3.29), we obtain
5 This implies that the objective production function is subject
not just to increasing returns to scale, but to decreasing
returns to factor proportions as well.
(3.27)
p.(1-a.i)<1.
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1 . a) Y. 1 e. = . (3.30)
w i i i i. p
The supply curve has constant elasticity pi/(1-pi). Because the
degree of homogeneity pi>1, the elasticity becomes negative, and
the supply curve is negative-sloping. Therefore, the effect of
localization economies is that at a given factor price ratio w/r,
the supply price of Yi relative to the wage rate, pi/w, is
decreasing with respect to the output.
The above profit-maximizing decisions, however, also repres-
ent a socially efficient production schedule. This is because
the private marginal rates of technical substitution calculated
from (3.26) are identical to the social ones from (3.27):
8Y./6L. a. K.
Y / 1-a. L.
1 1 1 1
Despite the presence of localization economies, production is
efficient, and is operated along the city's production
possibility curve.
Although production is efficient in the sense of the identi-
cal marginal rates of factor substitution for the two industries,
the marginal rate of product substitution in production (or
marginal rate of transformation) is generally not equal to the
price ratio. Totally differentiating (3.24) and using (3.29), we
derive the following marginal rate of transformation:
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dY p p2
- = - -- .(3.32)
dY2 2 1
This possible analytic complication, however, does not seem worth
pursuing, and we limit ourselves to the kind of localization
economies which ensure equality between the marginal rate of
transformation and the price ratio. 6 This is possible by adding
the following constraint:
p = P. (i=1,2). (3.33)
Under this assumption, of course, the ratio of marginal social
costs (i.e., the slope of the production possibility curve) is
equated to the ratio of marginal private costs (i.e., the price
ratio which is also identical to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion in consumption). The producer equilibrium conditions of
(3.29) under (3.33) now result in both production efficiency and
product mix efficiency.
3-4. Market Equilibrium
Urbanization diseconomies introduced by the consumption
sector, and localization economies introduced by the production
sector can now be combined to show the effect of the net
6 This is mainly because our overriding concern is to investigate
economic efficiency of different-sized cities and of alternative
city size distributions rather than of different industries.
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urbanization economies on the city economy in equilibrium. In
closing the model, we will first determine the factor market
equilibrium under the full employment assumption, including the
city's industrial composition in terms of factors, i.e., the
allocation of factors between the two industries. This will give
the complete solution to the output market equilibrium. In the
end, factors, products, and their prices can be solved for in
terms of the city's endowments of capital and population. The
prices may then be substituted into the indirect utility function
which will reflect the net effect of urbanization economies and
diseconomies in terms of the exogenous variables K and N.
Our single-city model can be summarized into three sets of
equations. From (3.15), the consumer equilibrium conditions,
piX. = we N 1 - N (i=1,2), (3.15)
from (3.29), the producer equilibrium conditions,
wL. rK.
piY. = . 1 (i=1,2), (3.29)
1 1
and the production possibility set, which consists of: from
(3.24) and (3.33), the objective production functions; and from
(3.18), the city's resource endowments, 7
7 For space saving in notation, we omit subscript i in the Y sign
hereafter.
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Y.= LaiK 1)aiP
EL= N 1 - gN
(i=1,2). (3.34)
K . = K,
The model is now closed by the condition that consumption of each
good equals its local production, or,
X. =Y.
I 1 (i=1,2). (3.35)
Therefore, by equating (3.15) to (3.29), we get
L. = a Nf1 - + rK
K =2 i-N +
K. =(1-..) 9.Iw)Nl~ 
_ gN + rK)1 1 1 rj 2x wN)
(3.36)
(i=1,2).
This equilibrium allocation of factors, however, must also
clear the factor markets. For this, we choose the labor market.
The total equilibrium labor must be the same as the city-wide
labor supply. Thus, by using (3.18), (3.34) and (3.36), we
obtain
L = L + L - Za G N 1 - + rK = N 1 - N1c..( 2 21 iif 2a) (i=1,2). (3.37)
This will also determine the equilibrium factor price ratio, or
the ratio of capital rental to wage rate,
r - gN K -1
1 1
(U=1,2), (3.38)
which is now solely a function of exogenous variables and
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parameters. By Walras' Law, the equilibrium factor price ratio
guarantees that capital is also fully employed. By substituting
(3.38) into (3.36), we determine Li and Ki as follows:
a.0.
L. - a__ -Nl - (i=1,2),2.27
(3.39)
K. = eI (1-a )eKi Z(1-a.)6. K (i=1,2).
2. 1
The above leads to this observation: in autarky equilibrium, the
allocation of a factor to industry i is proportional to the
weighted average of the factor's elasticity in that industry's
subjective production function, the weights being the consumer's
budget shares on all goods.
The output can now be obtained by substituting (3.39) into
the objective production functions (3.34):
Y.= X = 1(1 1 1iK)1-aie.Nl1 
-- Naii a9Z(1-a ) (INJ N 2 ) *t
(i=1,2) (3.40)
The prices are now derived by substituting (3.38) and (3.40) into
the demand functions (3.15):
w c9N t1 - N1-pa (i=1,2) (3.41)
z(1-a.)G. p(1-a.
where c = a a.9. Pai-1 .P Kp(ai-1)
1 t hu 1-ai n 
.
Due to the homogeneous nature of our model, only the ratio pi/w,
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that is the real price of good i in terms of labor, is determi-
nate.
We now show that the equilibrium is both unique and stable
by means of the supply and demand curves. Combining (3.29),
(3.34), and (3.38), we obtain the supply curves as in (3.30)
i _ (-a ) i i K -11_gN 1-ai (1-p)/p
w a (1 Z)(1-a )9i N2wZ
(i=1,2), (3.42)
and combining (3.15) and (3.38), we obtain the demand curves
PGl 1 1 (i=1,2). (3.43)
Both curves and the solution are depicted in Fig. 3-2 for in-
dustry 1. The supply curve has constant elasticity p/(l-p), and
the demand curve has constant elasticity -1. Since p/(l-p)<-l
with p>1, the supply curve is always flatter than the demand
curve, and they meet exactly once. Therefore, the equilibrium is
always unique and stable. 8
8 The Marshallian stability condition is met in this typical case
under external economies. Since firms will raise (lower) their
output when the excess demand is positive (negative) at a given
price, the equilibrium will always be restored. Under the
Walrasian stability condition in which the firms will adjust the
price according to the excess demand, however, the equilibrium
is unstable. Under our assumption that the firms do not re-
cognize the function of (3.23), the Marshallian condition seems
more appropriate.
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In order to check rough orders of magnitude for the equi-
librium, some tentative values are assigned to the parameters
which are presented in Fig. 3-2. First, we arbitrarily assume
that the upper limit of N mentioned in (3.19) to be 10", which in
turn determines that g/2n=0.25x10- 7 . For a city of size N=1x10,
for example, this means that 2.5 percent of the total time is
used for commuting, and L=0.975x10 6 . The critical value for our
model, however, is to come from the degree of homogeneity p.
Although not directly applicable to our model, an empirical study
by Shefer[1973] in estimation of localization economies reports
median values of p to be roughly between 1.03 and 1.05. This
study is a rare attempt to measure directly the extent of lo-
calization economies in industry production functions by applying
the US SMSA data of the two-digit SIC manufacturing industries to
a variant of the CES production function.9 Other US studies
based on urbanization economies (thus less relevant to our
study), however, report slightly different values (see
Sveikauskas[1975], Segal[1976], Moomaw(1981]). We initially
choose p=1.04.
The values of labor elasticities in the subjective produc-
tion function a1=0.7, a 2 =0.3 were deliberately chosen to allow
the two industries to have markedly different production
9 The abbreviations are as follows.
SMSA: Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
SIC: Standard Industrial Classification.
CES: Constant Elasticity of Substitution.
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technologies, which along with "mild" scale economies, generally
tend to retain the familiar concavity in the production
possibility curve despite scale economies (see Kemp[1964],
Melvin[1969]). With neutral preferences between the two goods
01=62=0.5, and K/N=2, we get for the first industry, for example,
LI=6.825x10 5 , K1 =6x10 5 , pl/w=0.869, and XI=Y1 =1.122x10 6 . The
output is remarkably large, because under constant returns to
scale, i.e. p=1, it would be only 0.657x10 6 . Despite our
allowance for multiple industries in the city, the existence of
only two industries in a big city seems to cause considerable
specialization by each industry.
Equation (3.41) shows that the equilibrium price (of good i
in terms of labor) is a function of per capita capital in the
city K/N, city size N, and a set of production, consumption, and
transportation parameters. When K/N increases at given N, the
price curve shifts down. This is a normal factor proportion
effect which is further accentuated here with localization econ-
omies. Now if we isolate the effect of K/N, the effect of city
size on the price can be identified. Taking the derivative of
(3.41) with respect to N, while holding K/N fixed, we arrive at
the following elasticity of price with respect to city size
d w Np(1-a )gN 0. (3.44)dN lp ' 1 N.
w
As expected from the elasticities of the supply and demand
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curves, the equilibrium price becomes a monotonically decreasing
function of N within a range which is much broader than, for
example, the one in (3.19). With equi-proportional increases in
K and N, the city will experience unequivocal decreases in
prices. Higher degrees of homogeneity p and greater capital
elasticities in the subjective production function (1-ai) will
increase the above elasticity in absolute terms, and accentuate
the relationship. This relationship is shown in Fig. 3-3 for the
first industry (i=1) with parameters ae=0.7 and p=1.04.
We are now ready to determine the equilibrium utility level
in the city. Substituting the factor price ratio (3.38) and the
prices of goods (3.41) back into the indirect utility function of
(3.16), we get 10
v = c 2 c3 NPl1 1-N Paisi, (3.45)
where: c = ali(1-a.)1-ai %jPei2 i ii
c = t(X.e.)-iei(_(.).)3 1 i iii
Unlike the price case of (3.41) and Fig. 3-3 in which urbaniza-
tion economies are largely reflected, the effect of N on the
utility level is not always beneficial. Here, urbanization dis-
economies are also reflected in the form of reduced labor with
10 For space saving in notation, we omit subscript i in the IT
sign hereafter.
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increased city size, which not only decreases the total resource
base of the city, but also increases the capital-labor ratio K/L.
Since all production functions are assumed to be subject to
decreasing returns to factor proportions, increase in N
eventually leads to diminished industry output. Thus, the equi-
librium utility level of (3.45) also represents the equilibrium
net urbanization economies for the city. This relationship is
presented in Fig. 3-4. With increase in N, the utility level in-
itially goes up rather rapidly, attains a maximum, and eventually
goes down in a less rapid, asymmetrical manner.
It is to be noted that each point on the curve of Fig. 3-4
indicates both an equilibrium and an optimum, not just in the
private sense but, on the account of p=p. (3.33), in the social
sense as well. The curve shows, for the city in autarky, the
highest level of welfare attainable under the production
possibility set, which is determined by the given city size N and
other internal characteristics of the city. On the other hand,
the "optimum city size", which corresponds to No of Fig. 3-4,
relates to the global maximum of the curve. This particular size
No and the resulting production possibility set assure that the
city output and welfare are maximized in real terms on a per
capita basis. It is found by dv/dN=O from (3.45), while holding
K/N fixed, and turns out to be
N _ p-1 (3.46)
o g (p-1)+pare
For the illustrative parametric values employed before (see Fig.
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3-4), No=2.86x10 6 , to arrive at v0 =1.324. This size No is below
the practical upper limit of N of (3.19), assumed to be 107, and
therefore remains as a potential attainable target.
Finally, it remains to show that the equilibrium welfare
level can actually be attributed to the underlying industrial
composition of the city. Monotonically transforming the direct
individual utility function (3.1) into the logarithms, and enter-
ing the oputput (3.40) into it, while recognizing xi=Xi/N, we get
log u = 29 log x. = c +log N 21gN pa
a 1i 1-i K'1-wi
where c = plog -aal 9..i (3.47)
4 7a.9.S Z(1-a.)9. N 1
It is a linear convex combination, or weighted average of xi in
the logarithms, the weights being the consumer's budget shares on
good i (i.e., Gi, Z91=1 ). Equation (3.47) is presented in Fig.
3-5 in which the top "TOTAL" curve exactly corresponds to the one
in Fig. 3-4, albeit in the logarithmic scale. The lower two in-
dustry curves represent utilities, or net urbanization economies
attributable to the respective industries, i.e., Gi(log xi).
Thus, vertical summation of them yields the total net urbaniza-
tion economies curve for the city as a whole. Of course, the in-
dustry curves attain maxima at different city sizes Ni, which can
be found by setting d(logxi)/dN=0, while holding K/N constant:
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N. 2x P-1 (3.48)
1 g P-l+pa
For the parameters used in Fig. 3-5, N1 =2.08x106 , and N 2=4.5x10 6 ,
setting respectively the upper and lower bounds to No=2.86x10 6 .
Because industries are differentiated only by ai, a labor-inten-
sive industry will have a smaller Ni than a capital-intensive in-
dustry.1 1
We have now completed modelling of our single-city that ex-
plicitly acknowledges the existence of multiple industries, and
therefore builds upon the single-industry, single-city models of
the supply-oriented approach. In particular, the industrial com-
position, or the output mix of the city, which has been determin-
ed by the weights from the utility function, gives rise to the
level of welfare or of net urbanization economies in the city.
We have thus proposed that urbanization economies and disecon-
omies be measured in utility terms. This is in the tradition of
general equilibrium. Unlike other single-city models, therefore,
our model indicates that in equlibrium, the criteria of
efficiency are met, i.e., efficiency in consupmtion, production,
and output mix.
11 Although we have maintained the existence of only two in-
dustries mainly for convenience, it is clear that the model can
operate under n industries. In that case, there will be a con-
tinuum of Ni corresponding ai (i=1,2,...,n), and No will
reflect all Ni.
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It is to be recalled that Isard's illustration of the rela-
tionship between net urbanization economies and city size as in
Fig. 2-1, is a noble concept owing to the emphasis on industrial
composition. However, it is incomplete as an analytic tool, due
to its lack of weights with which the industy curves could be
combined into the total net economies curve for the city. More-
over, the industry curves largely reflect the production situa-
tions only, and are measured in (nominal) dollar terms. Unless
(nominal) incomes are identical across different city sizes, the
curves do not reflect any welfare implications. It is clear that
our use of the utility function in the measurement can solve
these problems quite handily.
3-5. Migration and City Size Distribution
Like the models of the supply-oriented approach in general,
our single-city model was concerned with one city in isolation,
and not with its relationship with other cities. The equilibrium
of the city was achieved under the exogenous resource endowments
including population N, and nowhere was there any consideration
of a city size distribution in the national economy. In this
section, however, we establish a limited degree of inter-
dependence between cities and derive a resulting city size dis-
tribution by allowing free factor movements but not trade between
cities. In the Heckscher-Ohlin, constant-returns-to-scale world,
it is well known that perfect factor mobility and free trade are
substitutes as equilibrating forces. However, they are not in
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the world of urbanization economies and diseconomies in which not
only factor proportions but also the scale of factors are the
objects of the equilibrium. A complete balanced-trade model,
which is defined later, will be the subject of the next chapter.
In addition to the previous assumptions, we assume that all
cities share identical production, utility, and commuting cost
functions. We further suppose that people migrate costlessly
from city to city to maximize utility, that each migrant in the
nation owns capital equally and takes with him his share of it,
and that capital rentals as well as wages are spent in the city
where people work and live. Notice that the movement of people
does not change the ratio of capital to population in either the
source city or the host city, so that resources (capital and
population) are always distributed equally between cities on a
per capita basis. The utilization of resources, however, will
generally differ between cities of different sizes.
Now suppose initially that two cities A and B are engaged in
the exchange of factors by following the rules listed above.
With people (along with their capital) moving in response to
utility differences, an equilibrium is reached when a common
utility level is achieved in the two cities. Equation (3.45) of
our single-city model is directly applicable, and the equilibrium
conditions are 1 2
12 The constant term c3 contains an element with K/N. Since
KA/NA = KB/NB = K/N, however, c3 is the same in both cities.
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v c c N 1- V = c c NP 1-gNB PlaiiA 2 3 A 12s B 2 3 B 2a
VA = B' N A + NB =N, (3.49)
where: VA, VB = utility levels in cities A and B respectively,
c 2 , c 3 = constant terms of parameters, see (3.45),
NA, NB = populations of cities A and B respectively,
N = population in the nation.
The shapes of the utility curves and the solution for (3.49)
generally depend on the national population parameter N as it
relates to the optimum city size No of the single-city model.
When N is sufficiently small so that N(2No, a unique equilibrium
is reached at point P in Fig. 3-6, in which the horizontal axis
is fixed of length N, and measures NA from left to right and NB
the other way around. Due to the symmetry between the curves VA
and vB, which are adapted from Fig. 3-4, the equilibrium city
sizes NA and NB are identical but not greater than No (NA=NB.No).
Because P is on the non-falling part of both VA and vB curves
(i.e., net urbanization economies are not decreasing in both
cities), however, we should suspect that this equilibrium is
generally unstable, because slight migration from city B to A due
to an exogenous shock will increase VA as well as decrease vB- 1 3
The gap between VA and vB then becomes cumulative as the migra-
13 Due to the symmetry between the VA and vB curves, we will con-
sider henceforth only the case in which NA>NB-
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tion progresses. The migration will continue beyond Q at which
VA attains its maximum and NA becomes No. It is also clear that
even when NA=NB=No, the equilibrium is unstable due to the same
disequilibrating migratory flow. Of course, when N is even
smaller, for example NcNo, there is no justification for the ex-
istence of the two cities, and the migration will proceed until
city B is totally vacated so that NA=N<NO. However, this is an
extreme case which can hardly be imaginable in reality. To sum
up, it is therefore clear that a unique and stable equilibrium in
the city size distribution when N(2NO is not possible. A numeri-
cal example is given in fig. 3-6 for the unstable equilibrium at
P.
When N is larger, so that N>2No, multiple equilibria appear
to be reached at three different sets of city sizes such as
points P, Q, and R in Fig. 3-7. At Q which is on the rising part
of vB but also on the falling part of VA, the equilibrium city
sizes are different for the two cities, the magnitude of the dif-
ference being determined by the difference between N and 2No.
For the parametric values used in Fig. 3-7, it represents a
highly skewed city size distribution at NA=9-8x10l, and
NB=0.2x106 . However, the equilibrium at Q is most unstable,
because any movement toward another equilibrium point P un-
ambiguously improves the utility levels for both cities. Migra-
tion from city A to B, once started, will proceed until point P
is reached at which NA=NB>No. The equilibrium at P which is on
the falling part of both VA and vB, however, must be a stable
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one. A slight deviation from P toward Q will be met by counter-
migration from city A to B, thereby restoring the equilibrium.
When N>2No, therefore, a stable equilibrium is reached at P where
city sizes are identical but larger than No (NA=NB>NO). Since
the common utility level in the equilibrium falls as N increases,
however, there must be a practical limit in this equilibrium. It
would be unreasonable to operate under the confines of two cities
in the nation when N is much greater than 2No.
If we extend the above further to a more realistic and
general situation in which N is much larger than 2No and the ex-
istence of more than two cities are considered, however, we
suspect that the stable equilibrium city size will be No for all
cities in the nation. As Henderson[1977] argues, this is because
with N being sufficiently large, the divisibility problem due to
lumpiness can be avoided in replication of cities with size No.
For example as in Fig. 3-7, suppose there are many cities with
sizes slightly larger and smaller than No. With many cities in
existence, the sum of any "excess" populations beyond No from the
larger cities could be added to the smaller cities, thereby
helping to achieve No among all cities. Thus, all cities
eventually converge No in size.
It is argued that this rather "trivial" distribution of city
sizes in equilibrium is an inherent phenomenon in the models of
the supply-oriented approach. The lack of opportunity to trade
goods forces the city to produce locally what it consumes under
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the equilibrium conditions that reflect the internal character-
istics only. With no consideration given to other cities in both
production and consumption, all cities tend to be "standardized",
and are required to converge on the ideal city size No for
equilibrium. This is in a sharp contrast with the reality in
general, and the trade model in particular, which is to be
developed in the next chapter where cities of continuously diffe-
rent sizes can coexist and benefit from each other with trade
albeit in a suboptimal manner.
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4. A TRADE MODEL WITH SCALE ECONOMIES
4-1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to allow trade between the
two cities of our single-city type, and to review the resulting
city size distribution in the nation. As a general equilibrium
approach, this is an attempt to intergrate both the supply- and
demand-oriented approaches to the determination of city sizes and
output in general and to the equilibrium in the inter-city labor
markets in particular. Under the assumption that the nation con-
sists of the two cities, the inter-city terms of trade (P=P2/P:)
becomes endogenous, and is to be determined in equilibrium. As
such, we will retain all the assumptions of the previous chapter
but the no-trade provision, and add more specific assumptions in
due course. While housing consumption, commuting, and the labor
supply will still depend on the city's internal characteristics
even with trade, the production and consumption of traded goods
and the level of welfare will also depend on those of the trading
parter. In this way, the interdependence between the two cities
becomes more direct and realistic than that of the simple migra-
tion model of the last chapter.
This will be carried out in two steps. First, we will
develop a balanced free-trade model which meets such requirements
as free trade, zero total value of excess demands in all markets
within the nation (or Walras' Law), and no inter-city investment
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of capital. 1 In this step, migration is not allowed, and
therefore city sizes are fixed. Under urbanization economies and
diseconomies, although commodity prices will be the same in equi-
librium, factor prices, incomes, and utility levels will in
general differ between the two cities. The next step then will
be to allow factor movements to arrive at a common level of
utility between the two cities. Given the total endowments of
population (and capital) in the nation, this will allow us to
derive a system of cities with generally different sizes in equi-
librium. Despite scale economies, the model will operate much in
a similar manner as the standard trade model of factor propor-
tions and comparative advantage. This is the result of our
assumption to be made in which "mild" scale economies for both
industries give rise to incomplete specialization for the city.
4-2. Production under "Mild" Scale Economies
When the two traded goods are produced under increasing
returns to scale within the city, it is important initially to
assess the degrees of scale economies from the society's point of
view in each city. If they are sufficiently large and "severe",
the marginal social (as well as private2 ) opportunity cost that
1 Following the tradition in the international trade literature,
the term "balanced" here means that no inter-city transfer (in-
vestment, reparations, and gifts) of capital is taking place.
Under our assumption that capital and its rentals stay where its
owners work and live, the requirement is always met.
2 It is to be recalled that under our assumption of (3.33),
(i.e., p=pi, i=1,2), the ratio of marginal social costs is the
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measures the slope of the production possibility curve of the
city decreases, and the production possibility curve has a
convex, or "bowed-in" shape. This generally happens when the
difference in factor intensities of the two production functions
is relatively small compared to the degrees of scale economies.
Under the circumstances, specialization in any good pays both so-
cially and privately. Scale then becomes the dominant basis for
trade, and the usual stable equilibrium results in complete spe-
cialization by each city in one yet indeterminate good.3 This
situation, however, seems hardly plausible in the case of exter-
nal economies, because it would be naive to assume that the
entrepreneurs behave competitively despite such high degrees of
scale economies. This is especially so in the urban context, if
one accepts industrial diversity as a fundamental characteristic
of cities, particularly the largest ones.
On the other hand, "mild" degrees of scale economies combin-
ed with a large difference in the factor intensities yield the
familiar concave or "bowed-out" production possibility curve for
same as the ratio of marginal private costs.
3 An indeterminate pattern of trade and complete specialization
are the usual outcomes when trade is caused by economies of
scale. For example, Melvin[1969] arrives at an equilibrium in
which two identically endowed trading partners end up with
having markedly different utility levels by complete specializa-
tion. Henderson's single-industry model, on the other hand,
tacitly assumes "severe" degrees of scale economies, and starts
from complete specialization. He, for example, uses a high
degree of homogeneity of 1.25 (akin to p in our model) in a
numerical example (see Henderson[1977], p.680).
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the most part except for the extreme points close enough to both
axes. Now comparative advantage arising from different factor
proportions between cities of different sizes becomes the basis
for trade. Because the marginal social opportunity cost is
rising in this case, the equilibrium pattern of trade, under
neutral demands for the two goods, will generally show a more
modest specialization in the good for which the city has compar-
ative advantage in production and export. 4 In short, despite
scale economies, incomplete specialization is more likely under
moderate degrees of scale economies. In light of the empirical
evidence pointing to the relatively low degrees of homogeneity
(on the order of p=1.03-1.05, and certainly much less than 1.1,
for example, see section 3-3), and of the observed urban in-
dustrial diversity in reality, we assume that the city is subject
to the concave production possibility curve at least for its re-
levant part in trade.
Because this assumption is critical to our model, we now
probe it further. Specifically, the assumption of the concave
production possibility curve requires that d 2Y,/dY 22 =d(-p)/dY 2<0,
4 Differences in tastes between cities can of course be another
basis for trade. Because our focus here is on production under
scale economies, we make explicit this assumption of demand
neutrality between cities to separate the influence of tastes
and to determine the pattern (or direction) of trade. This is
also the usual practice in the Heckscher-Ohlin model in deter-
mining the pattern of trade. See Melvin[1969], Layard and
Walters([1978], pp. 113-119). In our model, because cities are
assumed to have identical log-linear utiltity functions, demands
are apparently neutral, and they spend the same proportions of
income on each good at any prices.
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according to (3.32) and (3.33), where p is the price of the
second good in terms of the first. For the representative city
engaged in trade, using the marginal productivity conditions and
full employment conditions, we first express all endogenous vari-
ables on the production side in terms of a single variable q,
defined below, and exogenous variables.
From the producer equilibrium conditions of (3.29), the
factor price ratio is equal to the marginal rates of substitution
in production, which, in turn, depend on the factor ratios alone,
regardless of the scale of output, in both industries: 5
r 1-ai (Kj)-1 (4.1)
w ai Li)
Along with the full employment conditions of factors from (3.34),
and letting
= (q-1) 11-- )tN -1 or,
gN rK
q = 2N wN (4.2)
1-2w
1 1
where: 1 < -< q < - , 0 < a2 < dl < 1
we derive the following:
5 Because of this reason and the resulting analytic convenience,
we have elected to use either r/w or q as the key endogenous
variable.
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L = a 1 (1-qa 2 ) N(1_gN), L = a2 -1) N 1 N1 a 1 -a 2  2a) 2 a-2 2a)
(4.3)
K- i- K (q-1) _N1
Li ai N 2 )
Finally substituting (4.3) into (3.29) and (3.34), the re-
maining endogenous variables are expressed in q: 6
Y =1 aa1,(1-( )1-ai K 1-ai aNa2 ( q-Ja1(1-qa2) q-1)a 1 1P
(4.4)
Y2= [aa22( -21-a2 K 1-a12 Na1g 12 (qaj-1)(q-1) a2-11P
p = c(K-p(ai1-a2 )[(pgN (q-1 ) P(ai-a 2 ) 1-qa 2 P-1 (4.5)1 t [2a J qui-1)
ai 1-ai p
where: c1 =
12 2( - 2 1-a2
Because K/N is assumed to be fixed throughout, for the city of a
given size N, (1-gN/2n) is constant, and q becomes a measure of
per capita total income deflated by the wage rate. Similarly,
(q-1) measures the ratio of factor rewards r/w. As (4.2)
indicates, when the city is completely specialized in the labor-
intensive first good (or capital-intensive second good), q
becomes 1/a (or 1/a 2 ). When it is incompletely specialized, q
takes an intermediate value between the two. In the autarky
6 The price ratio p can more readily be obtained from (4.8), soon
to follow, as the ratio of the marginal product of labor (or
capital) in the first industry to that in the second industry.
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equilibrium derived before in (3.38), q=1/Zaiei, 7@i=1.7
Differentiating the endogenous variables with respect to q,
we derive the following elasticities:
dYi q 
_ (a 2  + 1-a1 ) < 0,dq Y 1 1-qat2 q-1) '
(4.6)
dY 2 q = ai - 1-a 2) = 1-a +a2(gaj-1) > 0
dq Y 2  ga- 1l q-1) P (qa-1)(q-1)
dp q = 1(al-a2)(qi 1 - (qai-11-qa2 ) > 0. (4.7)
Since d(-p)/dY 2 = -(dp/dq)(dq/dY 2 ), and dY 2/dq>O from (4.6), if
dp/dq>0, which from (4-7) is very likely when (p-1) is suffi-
ciently small and close to zero, then d(-p)/dY 2 <0 and the produc-
tion possibility curve becomes concave. 8 It is to be noted that
under constant returns to scale, i.e., p-1=0, the price ratio of
(4.5) depends solely on the factor price ratio (the terms with
the exponents ±p(ai-a 2 )) that determines the factor proportions
7 For the purpose of comparative statics, however, q is a more
convenient measure than (q-1) in deciding the direction of
change in r/w as well as the degree of specialization by the
city between the two goods.
8 The elasticity of the price ratio with respect to the factor
price ratio r/w must lie between zero and one, because from
(4.2) and (4.7),
0 < dp r/w - P(al-aO (p-1)(q-1)
d(r/w) p (qai-1) (1-qa 2 ) < p(a 1 -a 2 ) < 1.
Thus, changes in the price ratio will have a magnifying effect on
the factor price ratio.
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via (4.3). Under increasing returns to scale, however, it also
depends on the relative degree of specialization in production,
or the allocation of factors between the two goods (measured by
the term with the exponent (p-1)). Thus, under the assumption of
small (p-1), the factor proportions effect will tend to dominate
over the "specialization effect".
In order to illustrate the above further, and for later use,
there is a need to examine the responses of the marginal products
of factors with respect to the change in q. 9 First, from the
marginal productivity conditions (3.26), and (4.3), we express
them in terms of q,
r= c N- 1_gN pal1 1-p(1-ai) (1-qa2)Pl
Pi 2 ( 2r)
r= c N -1 gEN pa2'(q-1)1-p(1-d2) (qaj-1)P1
P2 3  2a)
(4.8)
w = c2  N 1_gNpaj-1 a-1) (1-qa2
w = c3 ( )N - 1-gN)pa2-1(q-l)p(a2-1) (qa1- -1 fP2 c3  N) I21
9 We are dealing here with the marginal private products of
factors. However, the marginal social products, which are
greater than the corresponding private products by a factor of p
according to (3.27) and (3.33), can also be used. Of course,
the elasticities with respect to q are the same in both
measures.
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where: c 2 = aay'(1-ay) 1 -ai P(a -P2 P(lpl)-l
c-a2p - 1-p K p(1-a2)
c a 0~1-~ I C(1a a a)1P()P(- 2 )-3=12 2 Jl1-2tN
We now consider an extension of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem on the terms of trade and the marginal products of
factors under constant returns to scale. It is still applicable
to our model. Suppose now that the city, which is currently in-
completely specialized, is larger in size than its trading
partner, and that, owing to its higher K/L ratio, exports the
capital-intensive second good. Suppose also that the terms of
trade, p, is slightly improved. If, despite scale economies, the
production possibility curve is concave, the production of the
second good, Y 2 , will rise, and that of the first good, Y 1 , will
fall in the new equilibrium, thereby increasing the r/w ratio.
Then, the marginal product of capital which is employed rel-
atively intensively by the city must rise, and that of labor must
fall in both industries as in the following:
d(r/pi) q 
_ [1-p(1-ai) 
_ (p-1)a2] > 0,dq r/pi =t q-1 1-qa 2  '
d(r/p 2 ) q _ [ 1 -P(1a2) + (P- 1 )al > 0,
dq r/p 2  q-1 qa1-1j
(4.9)
d(w/pi) q 
_ _ p(1-ai) + (p-1)a 2] < 0,dq w/pi I q-1 1-qa 2 J
d(w/p 2 ) q_ - p(1-a2) (p-1)a,]
dq w/p 2 q q-1 qaj-1
This is because from the definition of p,
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dp q _ d(r/pi) q _ d(r/p 2 ) q
dq p dq r/pi dq r/p2
(4.10)
d(w/pi) q _ d(w/p 2 ) q
dq w/pi dq w/p2'
and as long as dp/dq>0 as assumed, the square-bracketed terms of
(4.9) must be positive. 1 0 Again, it is apparent that this
depends on (p-1) being sufficiently small. Under the assumption
of the concave production possibility curve, the endogenous vari-
ables are largely subject to the "factor proportions effect",
and, therefore, our model behaves much in line with the tradi-
tional factor proportions model under constant returns to scale.
More specific aspects of our model, including incomplete
specilaization, will be discussed in the following section.
4-3. A Balanced Free-Trade Model
In this section, we consider early-defined balanced free-
trade between the two cities A and B of fixed sizes that comprise
the nation. The cities share the identical industry production
functions (4.4), and are subject to their own concave production
possibility curves for the relevant ranges in trade as delineated
before. They also share the identical demand functions (3.15) in
which the expenditure for each good is a fixed proportion of the
10 The elasticities of the marinal products with respect to a
change in the factor price ratio r/w, on the other hand, must
lie between plus one and minus one. Refer to (4.2) and (4.9).
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income. We assume that city A is larger than B, i.e., NA>NB-
One of the general equilibrium conditions is that the terms of
trade be equal. Rearraging the terms of (4.5), and assigning qA
and qB for q to cities A and B respectively, we obtain
p= c (qA-1) P(a1-a2) (1Aa2) P-1A 4 2nI qAa 1-1
p c41- (q B1) P(a1-a2) I1-q1a2 P-1 (4.11)B 4[( -2n) qBa 1
pA B'
where: PA, PB = price ratios of good 1 to good 2 in A and B,
c _- I (1_ i -R P (a 1-a 2)
c4 - c 
__a (1-a 2)1-a2 N)
r~g =j9A NA K -1 rg=(B~ K-1 (4.12)
WA 2n NA wB 2w NB
rArBwA,wB = capital rentals, wage rates of A and B.
Equation (4.11) shows that the price ratios are monotoni-
cally increasing functions of q under our assumption of the
concave production possibility curves, i.e., dp/dq>O from (4.7).
It is immediately clear that if city sizes are identical, NA=NB,
then the autarky price ratios are the same, i.e., PA=PB at
qA=qB=1/Zaiei, and therefore there is no basis for trade. The
identical cities will remain in autarky. Only when city sizes
are different, the autarky price ratios become different, and
they will set the limits for the equilibrium terms of trade. As
NA is assumed to be greater than NB, PA is lower than PB in
-77-
autarky (qA=qB=1/Zaisi), and they become the lower and upper
limits respectively. In equilibrium, therefore, qA must be
greater and qB must be less than 1/Zaiei. This, along with
(4.2), gives the ranges of qA and qB:
1 1 11 < - < qB I C qA < - - (4.13)
ail - - ai91 - - aK2
From the response of the input of (4.3), it is clear that changes
in qA and qB directly affect the allocation of factors between
the industries toward the direction that reflects the comparative
advantage of each city. Moreover, according to the response of
the output Yi already noted in (4.6), the deviations of qA and qB
away from their identical autarky value in (4.13) represent the
relative degrees of specialization in equilibrium by cities A and
B respectively: the relatively capital-rich city A produces more
of the capital-intensive second good (and less of first good),
and the labor-rich city B produces more of the labor-intensive
first good (and less of second good) than under autarky.
Because the equilibrium terms of trade must lie within the
autarky price ratios of the two cities, incomplete specialization
by both cities is practically assured. This is because one
city's degree of specialization, in the sense of the shift from
autarky to the equilibrium production in trade, is to be limited
by that of the other. In short, specialization is limited by the
extent of the market. An illustration is given by Fig. 4-1-1 in
which PA and PB are related to q respectively for the renewed
parametric values1 l of NA=4x10 6 , NB=0.4X106 , p=1-03, a=0.8,
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a 2=0.2, 01=92=0.5, g/2n=0.25x10~7 , K/N=2. The PA curve is
located lower than the PB curve because NA>NB- S and T being the
autarky equilibrium points for cities A and B respectively
(qA=qB=2 .0), any value between them is a possible candidate for
the equilibrium terms of trade. 1 2 Thus, maximum qA is attained
when city A moves to U (qA=2 .11, qB=2 .0), and minimum qB is
attained when city B moves to V (qA=2 .0, qB=1.90) at the
parametric values of NA and NB. To test the sensitivity of the
model, we now vary the initial parametric values.
In the extreme case in which trade occurs between prac-
tically the largest and smallest cities (NA=107 , NB=104 , for
example), maximum qA is 2.367 and minimum qB is 1.731. Because
the price ratio is a decreasing function of city size, the gre-
atest deviation of either qA or qB from its autarky value is
realized when the difference in city sizes is greatest. Even in
this case, incomplete specialization by both cities is
guaranteed, because
11 The values of parameters ai and p are slightly changed here
partly to reflect the assumed concavity of the production
possibility curves. As we shall see later, however, this
change is not very critical in the behavior of the model.
12 Any line parallel to the horizontal axis and cutting the line
segment ST will also meet the PA and PB curves exactly once and
may determine the equilibrium. The equalization of the price
ratios, however, is only a necessary condition, and the equi-
librium also requires the balance of trade.
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2.367 = qA < - 5.0, 1.25 =- < qB = 1.731. (4.14)
a 2  a1
It is to be noted that at the previous parametric values of
p=1.04, a1 =0.7, and a 2=0.3 which reflect more "severe" scale
economies for both cities, the extreme city sizes yield maximum
qA=2 .4 6 2 and minimum qB=1. 6 8 4 . Although even greater specializa-
tion is now potentially possible, both cities will still retain
concavity in the production possibility curves over the possible
values of qA and qB, (qA=2 .0-2 .4 6 2 , qB=1.68 4 -2 .0), because on the
account of (4.7) the elasticities of the price ratios are still
greater than zero:
0 < 0.551 < dLP& 9A < 0.632 < dpB -E < 0.719 < 1. (4.15)dqA PA - -dqB PB -
The elasticities are also less than 1, indicating that PA and PB
are strictly concave functions of qA and qB respectively.
Finally, (4.15) shows that the PA curve must be less elastic than
the PB curve with respect to qA and qB in equilibrium.
As in (4.14), both cities will still be incompletely spe-
cialized in equilibrium due to the fact that the maximum qA is
less than 1/a 2 (qA=2.462<3 .3 3 3 =1/a2), and the minimum qB is
greater than 1/ai (qB=1.684>1.4 2 9=1/a1). It is thus clear that
our assumption of concave production possibility curves and in-
complete specialization is sustained under a wide range of city
sizes, and that the behavior of our model is stable at varying
parameter values.
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Fig. 4-1-2, on the other hand, illustrates a linear func-
tional relationship between the factor price ratio and q, i.e.,
qA or qB, Of (4.12) under the parametric values therein. Due to
its larger city size and thus greater urbanization diseconomies,
city A's factor price ratio, rA/wA, in autarky at S is lower than
that of city B at T. In trade equilibrium, of course, rA/wA will
rise up and rB/wB will fall down along their respective lines as
the arrow marks indicate.
However, will the factor price ratios be equalized in
equilibrium? It is well known that according to the Heckscher-
Ohlin model under constant returns to scale, trade equilibrium
ensures the equalization of both factor prices and factor price
ratios (more accurately both absolute and relative factor
rewards 1 3 ) between the trading partners. Under increasing
returns to scale, however, this will generally not happen.1 4
Indeed, (4.11) and (4.12) show that rA/wA will be higher than
rB/wB in equilibrium, reversing the autarky situation. Thus, the
equilibrium will not be strictly Pareto optimal within the na-
tional economy, in the sense that the marginal rate of substitu-
13 Although we use the terms factor "price" and factor "reward"
interchangeably to denote wage rates and capital rentals, our
use of the term "price" is simply traditional. Since the
prices of capital or labor services are what we are after
rather than the prices of capital or labor per se, the term
"reward" is more appropriate. See Kemp([1964], pp. 48-49).
14 Urbanization diseconomies, which merely determine the labor
supplies of the cities, are not related to this phenomenon.
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tion between factors, or the factor price ratio under perfect
competition, is not the same between the cities. However, to the
extent that (p-1) is sufficiently small in (4.11), the spe-
cialization effect tends to be minimal, and there remains a
strong possibility that the difference in the factor price ratios
will be reduced in equilibrium. This will be probed later.
In addition to (4.11), equilibrium requires that trade be
balanced. Because inter-city investment and transport costs are
not considered, this requires that the national demand for any
good must be equal to the national supply. Under (4.11) and
according to Walras' law, we are free to choose either good for
the balance of trade, and for this purpose we choose the second
good. Already knowing the pattern of trade under neutral demands
for the goods in both cities, we define the net excess supply of
this good by city A, E2A, as the (nonnegative) difference between
the local supply, Y2A, and the local demand, X2A. From (3.15),
(3.29) and (4.3), this is calculated to be:
E = Y - X =A w_ qAlaii-1 N 1(-UA > 0. (4.16)2A 2A 2A P2A ai-a2 A 2x) -
Substituting the marginal product of labor in the second in-
dustry, wA/p2A, from (4.8) into the above, we express E2A in
terms of qA,1 5
15 For completeness, the net excess demand for the first good by
city A, ElA, is
E =X - Y A_ qAlaiai-1 N 1 > 0,1A 1A 1A PlA ai-a2 A 2w ) -
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E2A c5 N 1- gNApa2(qA-1) p(a2-1)(qAai-1)P 1(qAlaiGi-1),E2 5  A 1
(4.17)
where: c5  [a2(a2 1-a2 p(a a )-p (A) p(1-a 2 )
Likewise, we define the net excess demand for the second
good by city B, E2B, as the (nonnegative) difference between the
local demand, X2B, and the local supply, Y2B, and express it in
terms of qB, 1 6
E 2 B= X 2B- Y 2B= w_ l-qBlai9i N (1 -gNBl > 0, (4.18)
E2B c5 N 1- gBpa2 (qB-1)p (a2-1) (qBai-1)p~1(1-9Blai91). (4.19)
P2B ~ B 2j
Hence, the balance of trade:
E1A c6 N 1 palfqA-1) ~lAa2)p 1(qAlai91-1),
where: c 6  [o1(1-a) 1ai p(a-2p (FAIp(1-a2 )6 1 1 1 1- 2 NA
16 The net excess supply of the first good by city B, E1B, is
E =lY - X w_-qBai'Gi N B1-- > 0'
1B 1B 1B P1B a1 -a 2  B 2 -
E1B= c6 NB 21- pafB1p -1) (1~4Ba2) -(1-qBlai9i)-
Of course, the last terms of c5 and c6 here must contain the
element KB/NB instead of KA/NA, but it is to be reminded that
KA/NA = KB/NB = K/N.
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E2A E 2B (4.20)
Equations (4.17) and (4.19) are illustrated in Fig. 4-2 in
which the arrow marks indicate the opposite responses away from
the common autarky point (qA=qB=2 .0, E2A=E2B=O) by cities A and B
along the E2A and E2B curves respectively for the parametric
values employed therein. The reaffirmation by Fig. 4-2 of our
presumed pattern of trade, however, is not limited to the par-
ticular parametric values employed. The pattern of trade is
still maintained under a more general set of parametric values
according to the following elasticities of E2A and E2B with
respect to qA and qB:
dE2A qA = qA [ 7aisi + (P-l)ai 
_ p(- 2 ) (4.21)
dqA E2A qAlaiei-1 qai-1 qA-1
which, under trade, i.e., qAlai6i>1, can be restated as
dE2A qA > QA 1-zai6i + (p-1)ai > 0; (4.22)
dqA E2A > qA1(qaiGi-1) (qA-1) qAa-1 0
whereas qB is to be lower than its autarky value, and the neg-
ative elasticity with respect to qB is
dE2 
-B = [ aii + p(1-a2) 
- (p-l)ail > 0,
-dqB E2B Bi-qBai8i qB-1 qBai-1 J
because, on the account of (4.9), the sum of the last two terms
of (4.23) must be positive.
Fig. 4-2 also suggests some clues to the possible degrees of
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specialization in production by both cities in equilibrium.
Being monotonically increasing functions of parameters NA and NB
within the relevant ranges of qA and qB respectively, the E2A and
E2B curves will rotate up (or down) around the common autarky
point when NA and NB increase (or decrease). 1 7 Thus, as for the
smaller city B, because in equilibrium qB will be located much
farther away from the autarky point than qA will be in city A,
the degree of specialization by city B in the first good will
tend to be higher than that by city A in the second good. Even
intuitively, this is a plausible result. To the extent that spe-
cialization is limited by the extent of the market, the realiza-
tion of scale economies in trade by specialization will be
greater for the smaller city B with its greater export market
(for the first good) than city A. In the end, however, the
smaller market size of city B will tend to limit the overall
trade volume. This presents a contrast to (4.11) in which the
greatest trade potential, in terms of the difference between the
autarky price ratios, can be found between the largest and
smallest cities.
Finally, the solution in equilibrium can be obtained by
17 Although increase in parameter NA, with KA/NA fixed, will
eventually tilt down the E2A curve due to the dominance of
urbanization diseconomies over scale economies, this will
happen only in cities of sizes far greater than our largest
city (Nmax=lx107 ) . This is because dE2A/dNA<O when
NA>(2u/g)(1+a 2 )-', which at the parametric values of Fig. 4-2,
is 3.333x10 7 . The same will apply to city B and the first good
market as well.
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solving the two sets of equations regarding the equalization of
the price ratios (4.11), and the balance of trade consisting of
(4.17), (4.19) and (4.20) simultaneously for the two unknowns qA
and qB. Due to the apparent difficulty in solving them algebrai-
cally, however, we will approach them by numerical iterative
methods in two steps. First, we will derive numerically the fun-
ctional relationship between qA and qB that satisfies both (4.11)
and (4.13). Second, the above function then will be substituted
into (4.17) and (4.19) so that E2A and E2B could be expressed as
functions of only qA, and thus be amenable to finding the solu-
tion to (4.20). Since the two steps are essentially finding the
roots of qA and qB numerically, in view of their magnitudes we
will maintain a tolerance level of at least !10~.
As the first step, two graphs of Fig. 4-3 illustrate the
numerical relationship between qA and qB that equalizes the
product price ratios PA and PB in (4.11), and guarantees incom-
plete specialization by both cities. As noted before, Fig. 4-3-1
shows that qA and qB are monotonically increasing functions of
the common price ratio while maintaining their ranges,
1 1__ 1
- =1.25 < 1.90 < qB < 1 = 2.0 < qA < 2 .11 < 5
ai 
-aisi 
- 2
as the result of the difference in the sizes of cities A and B.
The corresponding range of the common price ratio is
0.6105 pA=pBZ0. 6 4 7 5, indicating the limits given by the autarky
price ratios of cities A and B respectively. Fig. 4-3-2 thus
shows the opposite directions taken by qA and qB away from the
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autarky point, i.e., dqB/dqA<0 when PA~PB- Again, any point on
the curve is a possible equilibrium point. We now use the
numeric data generated in this step as the input in the next
step.
In the second step, the data represented by Fig. 4-3 are
then substituted into (4.17) and (4.19) to generate the two
graphs of Fig. 4-4. Of these, Fig. 4-4-1 confirms (4.22) and
(4.23): whereas E2A is a monotonically increaing function of qA'
E2B is a monotonically decreasing function of both qA and qB-
Moreover, under the concave production possibility curves in both
cities, the price ratios and qA must move in the same direction,
as noted in (4.7). Thus, Fig. 4-4-2 is almost identical to Fig.
4-4-1. A unique equilibrium is therefore obtained at E that
clears the markets in both cities for the second good, and on the
account of Walras' Law, for the first good as well. By the
virtue of the slopes of the E2A and E2B curves (dE2A/dp>O,
dE2B/dp<O and P=PA=PB), it is clear that the equilibrium is also
stable (i.e., dE2B/dp - dE2A/dp < 0)-18 For the parametric
values so far maintained, the equilibrium yields the following
solutions for the endogenous variables: qA=2 .009 3 , qB=1-9099,
PA=PB=0. 6 1 3 7 , E2A=E2B=5.024x10 4 . As was expected, the deviation
of qB from the autarky point is far greater than that of qA
(0.0901 vs. 0.0093). Thus, despite the significant shift away
18 Notice that both the Marshallian and Walrasian stability con-
ditions are met here. See Chapter 3, Footnote 8 for details.
-92-
(X 1000)
1r--
E2A
E2B
6
0 l
2
Fig. 4-4-1:
a = 0.8
2.02
q A
Numerical Solution of (4.11) and (4.20), qA vs. E2 -
a 2= 0.2 S= 9 2= 0.5 p = 1.03
N = 4x10 6A N = 0. 4x10
6
B N A E = 2NNA NB
- = 0.25x10~2w
In equilibrium at E: qA= 2.0093
pA B = 0.61372
qB 1.90991
E 2A = E2B = 5.024x104
-93-
(X T00)
r-
E2A
E2B
6
0.61750.105
Fig. 4-4-2: Numerical Solution of (4.11) and (4.20), p vs. E2 -
1 = 92= 0.5 p = 1.03
N = 4x10 6A N = 0.4x10
6
B N A E = 2NNA NB
2-- = 0.25x10 72w
In equilibrium at E: qA = 2.0093 B = 1.90991
E 2A = E 2 B = 5.024x10
4
a 1= 0.8 a2= 0.2
pA = B = 0.61372
-94-
from the autarky situation in city B, the situation in city A has
barely been changed, thereby limiting the overall trade volume.
We now turn to the gains from trade in each city by looking
at the improvement in the level of utility. For the represen-
tative city, the indirect utility function (3.16) is denoted as a
function of q by the use of (4.2) and (4.8),
v = c N - N plaiG _q)-pI(1-ai)61 (1-qa2) (qa(-1)02 p-1
(4.24)
where: c = a 92 [aai ( 1 )(1-ai)i P( a ) 1-p(KpI(1-ai)Oi7 1 2  ii 1 2 N
Differentiating the above, we obtain
dv q = 1 - p( 1 -ZaSi) q + (p-1) 91a2 + 92a (4.25)dq v q-1 (1-qa 2  qaj-1
which becomes negative, zero, or positive if q is less than,
equal to, or greater than its autarky value (1/Zaioi) respec-
tively. Thus, greater improvement in welfare is obtainable in
both cities whenever q is located farther away from the autarky
point, i.e.,
dv d> , vB>0, < qBC 1 < qA < 1 (4.26)
dqA -dqB a1  Xaisi a2
The above relationship along with the utility levels of both
cities in both autarky and equilibrium is illustrated in Fig. 4-5
in which the arrow marks indicate the opposite directions of
movement by the cities from autarky to equilibrium. Because the
-95-
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equilibrium point B for city B is located considerably farther
away from the autarky point than its counterpart A for city A,
the improvement in welfare is accordingly greater for the smaller
city. While both cities gain from trade, this suggests that not
only is the smaller city more dependent on trade, the gains from
trade is also greater for the smaller city.1 9
Complete numerical solutions to all pertinent endogenous
variables are listed in Table 4-1 for the parametric values main-
tained so far in this chapter. They are derived by substituting
the results of Fig. 4-4 into the appropriate equations of sec-
tions 4-2 and 4-3. Notice in particular that the difference in
the factor price ratios between the two cities, although con-
siderable in autarky (0.45 vs 0.495), is kept to a minimum in
equilibrium (0.45419 vs. 0.4504). The difference, albeit small,
nevertheless suggests that the marginal rate of substitution
between factors is not equated between the cities. Due to the
externality involved in scale economies, therefore, the equi-
lilibrium is not strictly optimal in the national sense. It is,
however, still optimal within the cities because not only is the
marginal rate of substitution between factors is the same in the
two industries, but the marginal rate of substitution in consum-
tion and the marginal rate of transformation are the same within
the cities. Thus, a slight discrepancy exists in local and na-
19 Notice that not only the utility levels of both cities but
also the total national output in both goods is increased (see
Table 4-1).
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Table 4-1: Solutions to Endogenous Variables.
Endogenous CITY A CITY B
Variables Autarky Equilibrium Autarky Equilibrium
q 2.0 2.0093 2.0 1.9099
2.88x10 6
7. 2x10 5
1. 6x106
6. 4x106
0.45
3.9865x10 6
6.5298x106
0.6105
3.9865x10 6
6. 5298x10 6
0
0
1.27551
2.871x10 6
7.2893x10 5
1.5803x10 6
6.4197x10 6
0.45419
3.9662x10 6
6.563x10 6
0.6137
3.997x10 6
6.5128x106
3.08x104
5.024x10 4
1.27553
3.168x10 5
7.92x10 4
1. 6x10 5
6.4x105
0.495
4.0243x10 5
6.2148x10 5
0.6475
4.0243x10 5
6.2148x10 I
0
0
1.2503
3.2631x10
6. 9686x10
1.8112x10 5
6.1888x10
0.4504
4.2304x10 5
5.888x10 5
0.6137
3.922x10 4
6.3904x105
3.08x104
5.024x10 4
1.2516
Exogenous NA = 4x10 6  KA/NA = 2 NB = 0.4x106  KB/NB = 2Variables
a =0.8 a2= 0.2 9 = 92= 0.5
Parameters
p = 1.03 g/2x = 0.25x10-7
K 1
r/w
Y,
p
xl
x 2
E 2
v
-98-
tional optimality.
4-4. Migration and Balanced Free-Trade
The balanced free-trade model of the last section showed
that while the utility levels of both cities were improved after
trade, they were not equalized, thereby leaving a tendency for
factors to move. In that model, city sizes were exogenous, and
factor movements were not considered. In this section, however,
we incorporate factor movements into the model, so that city
sizes become endogenous, and are to be determined in equilibrium
given the exogenous variable N, the national population. We are
particularly interested in finding out the equilibrium city size
distribution and the welfare implications thereof.
Under urbanization economies and diseconomies, factor move-
ments and trade are not perfect substitutes for each other, and
consideration of both of them is essential. We have already
noted that whereas factor movements alone yield identical city
sizes in equilibrium that offer no basis for trade, trade alone
does not guarantee the same utility levels between the cities of
different sizes unless by pure chance. Because both trade and
factor movements are simultaneously considered under the general
equilibrium setting, this model represents a more direct and
realistic rendition of the interaction between cities. Hence a
more refined integration of both the supply- and demand-oriented
approaches.
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As for the behavioral assumption in factor movements, this
new model will still operate under our somewhat restrictive
assumption in which capital and its rentals are both invested and
spent where the capital owner/laborer lives and works. The lo-
cation decision thus becomes multi-dimensional. In his costless
move from city to city to maximize utility, the capital
owner/laborer has to consider not only the marginal product of
labor, but also the marginal product of capital and the net
housing costs (after the rebate from the land bank), all specific
to each city. Despite its restrictiveness, however, it is argued
that our assumption is more suitable to our purpose in our model
than the usual practice in the trade literature in which workers
have no claims for capital including land, and utility essen-
tially refers only to the real wage rate or the marginal product
of labor. Because capital always moves with the laborer under
our assumption, we will use the term "migration" to denote the
combined movements of factors.
City sizes being endogenous now, we define at the outset a
new variable z as the population share of the larger city A out
of the national population N in equilibrium. With two cities in
the nation, we obtain that
z = NA/N, 1-z = NB/N,
(4.27)
0 < 1-z < 1/2 < z < 1.
Following the last section, we can determine the equilibrium of
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our migration and trade model by solving simultaneously three
equations regarding: the equalization of the product price
ratios, PA=PB; the balance of trade, E2A=E2B; and the equaliza-
tion of the utility levels, VA=vB. The last equation, however,
needs further discussion.
As for city A, the indirect utility function (3.16) can be
rewritten by the use of (4.2) and (4.27) as
v = 0918 8 2p01 (wA-)qA 1 gNz, (4.28)A 1 2 A P2A 2x)
which, by (4.16), can again be specified as
v 2a-96 2 )(N) p91 E qA (4.29)VA 1 - -12 A2A z(q Ajd3.e-1V
Likewise, for city B, we obtain
VB 91882(a - -a )()- p E qB (4.30)B 1 2 a1 2 (N PB2B (1-z) (1-qB2:ai6i)
From (4.29) and (4.30), provided that the price ratios are equal-
ized (PA=PB) and the trade is balanced (E2A=E2B), the utility
levels are equalized only if
+ =-z s., or, qB = ,Ail (4.31)
qA qB QA aii-z
which further limits the deviations of qA and qB from their
autarky value, 1/Zaioi, but is nevertheless in line with their
required directions of change in trade, i.e.,
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9qA R 
_ qA(1/Eiai) < 0, at constant z. (4.32)
aqB qA (/a9)q
Therefore, one of the necessary conditions for the equalization
of the utility levels requires that the weighted average of the
reciprocals of qA and qB be Zaisi, the weights being the popula-
tion shares of cities A and B respectively. Of course, the equi-
librium achieved in the last chapter via migration only
(qA=qB=1/Zaiei and z=1/2) satisfies this as a special case.
By utilizing (4.31), we can thus reduce one variable qB and
express the relevant equations in terms of the two unknowns qA
and z. Substituting (4.31) into (4.11), we obtain
p = C 1gNz (qA-1) Ip(ai-a2) 1-qAa2 p-1A 4 V 2r JqAai-1)
p =c i 1-gN(1-z)) qA(1-z)-qAlai91+z))P(al-a2) fiB= 4l 2a qAlaisi-z )J1
fl qA01(a I-aC(2 )-z(1-qAc(2 )P-1
1qAG 2 (a I-a 2) -z(qAai1)'
pA PB. (4.33)
Likewise from (4.17-20), we get
E2A c5(Nqz)p 1- gFZ)Pa2 (qA-1) p(a2-1)(qAai-1) _(qAFlai~i-1),E2 =  
E =c [N(1-z)] 1- gN(1-z) pa2 qA(1-Za9i)-z(qA-1))p(a2-1) ,2B= 5 2 x IqA aisi-z ) 2
_ qA 2 (ai1-a 2)-_z(qAai1-1)_ p-1 (z(qAlaiei-1))
2 qAlai9i-z ) qAlai9i-z }'
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E2A E 2B (4.34)
Finally from (4.29-30) and (4.34), we derive for later use
V A
cy (Nz)p- 1-gNz plai~i qA~qA-1~l-) ai (qAa2)a1(qAa1-1) 62 P,
VB 
=
c~1 [(-)~11gN4(1-z))plaili qA(1-Zaie1)-z(qA-1)I PI(ai-1)eic7 \1z1- 2n )qA2ai9i-z )3
f3
1-z qA91(ai-a2)-z(1-qAa2))191 qA62(a1-a2)-z(qAa1-1))02 P-1
Zaii-a2z qAaii-z }_QAaii-zJ'
VA =VB. (4.35)
The solution in equilibrium can now be obtained by solving
simultaneously (4.33) and (4.34) for qA and z. As before, we
apply the two-step numerical methods to them. First, we derive
numerically from (4.33) the relationship between qA and z in
which the price ratios are equalized. It is illustrated in Fig.
4-6-1 where P indicates the "trivial" solution point with no
trade (qA=qB=1/Zaii) and identical sizes between the two cities
(z=1/2). As the population share of city A increases rightward
from P thus making trade feasible, qA also increases initially,
then attains a peak, and finally decreases. On the other hand,
qB calculated from (4.31) decreases monotonically. Trade volume
being largely determined by the smaller city under increasing
returns to scale, this is an expected result. As city B gets
smaller and smaller, the extent of specialization in city A
-103-
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Fig. 4-6-1: Numerical Solution of (4.33), z vs. q.
61= 62= 0.5 p = 1.03
N = 4.8x106 K/N = 2 ! - 0.25x10 72T
2.2
2
a = 0.8 a 2= 0.2
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Fig. 4-6-2: Numerical Solution of (4.33), z vs. p.
a = 0.8
a2= 0.2 a1= 2 = 0.5
i
z
p = 1.03
N = 4.8xlO6 g - 0.25x10 72K/N = 2
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measured by (qA-1/eaisi) eventually decreases, but that in city B
(1/Zai6i-qB) increases due to its increasing export market size.
Fig. 4-6-2 also shows that the equalized price ratio decreases
with respect to increases in z. Because the equilibrium price
ratio is determined largely by the autarky price ratio of the
larger city, and because its autarky price ratio decreases as
city A gets larger, this is a plausible result.
We now apply the above numeric data represented by Fig. 4-6
to the balance of trade equation (4.34), and generate Fig. 4-7
which shows the relationship between the equalized price ratio
and the net national excess supply of the second good (E2A-E2B)-
Because the data already reflect both (4.31) and (4.33), it is to
be noted that our application of the data for the determination
of the balance of trade will also reflect the equalization of
utility levels on the account of (4.29) and (4.30). In short,
Fig. 4-8, which shows the relationship between the utlity levels
of the two cities vs. z, by the application of the same data to
(4.35), is another equivalent graphic manifestation of Fig. 4-7.
In both figures, we have two equilibrium points: whereas P refers
to the autarky equilibrium with identical city sizes (z=0.5), Q
refers to the trade equilibrium with different city sizes
(z=0.75793).
Are they stable? Because the "trivial" equilibrium at P in-
volves no trade and is determined entirely by migration, its
stability is determined by the shapes of the utility curves of
-106-
0.63 -
'A =%p
0.615-
0.6 -
-i 0 1 3 5 7 9
E2A-B
(X 00)
Fig. 4-7: Numerical Solution of (4.34), E2A-E2B vs. p.
6 = 92= 0.5 p = 1.03
N = 4.8x106 gK/N = 2
At P, E E =2A 2B 8
At Q E A= E 2= 8.5373x10 4
-= 0.25x10 7
B= 0.62713
pA B= 0.62037
a = 0.8 a 2= 0.2
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Fig. 4-8: Equilibrium Utility Levels vs. City Size Distribution.
a 1= 0.8 a 2= 0.2 1 = 2= 0.5 p = 1.03
N = 4.8x106 -/I = 2
At P, z = 0.5
At Q, z = 0.75793
g = 0.25x10 7
VA= VB= 1.28449
VA= B= 1.27843
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the two cities as they are related to their respective city
sizes. 2 0 As was noted before in the last chapter, in a two-city
framework the equilibrium at P is stable only if the equilibrium
city sizes are greater than the optimum city size of the single-
city model No which at the current parametric values is
2.201x106 . At P in Fig. 4-8, for example, NA=NB=0.5N=2.4x106 >No,
and it is thus stable. More on this will follow later. The
equilibrium at Q, on the other hand, concerns both trade and
migration, and its stability test requires the examination of
both Fig. 4-7 and Fig. 4-8. According to Fig. 4-7, d(E2A-E2B)/dp
is negative in the neighborhood of Q, so it is stable in terms of
trade under the Marshallian criterion which we have adopted in
place of the Walrasian one for our models under external econ-
omies of scale. However, it is unstable in terms of mrigration,
because, according to Fig. 4-8, any migratory disturbance from Q
will be cumulative in either direction, and set a stage for
further disequilibrating migration away from the equilibrium. 2 1
It is to be noted that whereas a more even city size distribution
than the one at Q is welfare-improving for both cities, a more
skewed distribution toward a greater primacy of the larger city
is welfare-deteriorating for both cities.
20 Refer to Fig. 3-7, Chapter 3. The P here corresponds exactly
to the P of Fig. 3-7, albeit at different parametric values.
21 This equilibrium is akin to the one at Q of Fig. 3-7, but, of
course, is different from it due to the existence of trade
here.
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While the equilibrium at P is meaningful and stable only
when the national population is larger than twice the optimum
city size of the single-city model (N>2NO) within the two-city
framework, the equilibrium at Q cannot be obtained otherwise.
This is because from (4.34) or (4.35), as long as trade occurs,
the balance of trade or equalization of the utility levels cannot
be achieved unless NA>No and NB<No. Due to the complexities in-
volved in both equations, however, it would be instructive to
look at Fig. 3-4 instead. The single-city relationship between
the utility level vs. city size, which is analogous to the one
implied by (4.35), is reproduced here for our current parametric
values as Fig. 4-9. Although (4.35) would additionally reflect
the gains from trade associated with specific city size distribu-
tions especially for smaller cities, its curvature with respect
to the individual city size is essentially the same as that of
Fig. 4-9. According to Fig. 4-9, it is clear that NA and NB must
be on the opposite sides of No and N=NA+NB>2NO for the existence
of the equilibrium.2 2
Moreover as N increases, accommodation of the increased na-
tional population within the two cities requires that z must in-
crease as well, thus leading to a tendency toward a greater
primacy. This relationship from (4.35) is illustrated in Fig. 4-
22 Due to the asymmetry of the curve, at any common level of
utility the difference between the equilibrium city size and No
will be greater for city A than city B. Hence, in equilibrium,
NA+NB>2NO. For example, refer to Table 4-2.
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Fig. 4-9: Utility Level with City Size (Single-City Model).
a = 0.8
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Fig. 4-10: Population Share of City A vs. N (at Q).
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10, and the consequent deterioration in the utility levels for
both equilibria at P and Q is given in Fig. 4-11. According to
Fig. 4-11, because the utility levels at P are always higher than
those at Q at any relevant N, it is tempting to denote the point
o (where NA=NB=No) as the "optimum national population". Com-
plete solutions to all relevant endogenous variables at N=4.8x106
and other parametric values employed in this chapter are given in
Table 4-2 for the equilibria at P and Q and for both cities.
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Table 4-2: Solutions to Endogenous Variables.
Endogenous CITY A CITY B
Autarky Trade Autarky Trade
Variables Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium Equilibrium
at P at Q At P at Q
q 2.0 2.01750 2.0 1.94712
1. 8048x106
4. 512x10 I
9. 6x10 I
3.840x10 6
0.47
2.4414x10 6
2.6303x10 6
6.7687x10 5
1.4219x10 6
5.8543x106
0.4525
3.6106x10 6
1.8048x10 6
4.512x10 5
9.6x10 5
3.840x10 6
0.47
2.4414x10 6
9.1846x105
2.0973x10 I
4.9937x10 I
1.8245x10 6
0.4598
1.223x10 6
3.893x10 6 5.9908x10 6
0.6271 0.6204
3.893x10 6 1.8007x10 6
0.6271 0.6204
2.4414x10 6
3. 893x106
0
0
1.28449
0.5
2. 4x10 6
3.6635x10 6
5.9054x10 6
5.29x10 4
8.54x10 4
1.27843
0.75793
3.6381x10 6
2.4414x10 6 1.1701x10 6
3.893x10 6 1.8861x10 6
0
0
1.28449
0.5
2.4x10 6
5.29x10 4
8. 54x104
1.27843
0.24207
1. 1619x106
Exogenous N = 4.8x106 2Variables
a = 0.8 a2= 0.2 6 = a2= 0.5
Parameters
p = 1.03 g/2v = 0.25x10~7
K 1
K 2
r/w
Yi
p
x1l
X 2
v
z
N
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
On the basis of our findings from the last two chapters in
general and the migration and trade model in particular, we can
derive some broad policy implications regarding economic
efficiency with respect to city size distributions in the nation.
It is hoped that these points will be useful in devising con-
temporary national urban develoment policies that are concerned
with affecting the spatitial allocation of populations among
cities. It is however to be noted at the outset that economic
equality which generally is no less important in such national
policies is not elaborated here in view of our models in which
homogeneous individuals own an equal amount of capital as well as
an equal access to housing. Because cities are also assumed to
share human and capital resources equally on a per capita basis
as well as identical production technologies, the consideration
of economic equality becomes irrelevant in equilibrium when the
equilibrium involves perfect mobility of factors between cities.
Also not elaborated in this connection are equally important
socio-political considerations such as national unity and poli-
tical integration.1
(a). The optimum city size distribution in which potential
level of welfare for all in the nation is maximized is char-
1 For specific goals of national urban development policies, see
the literature cited in Chapter 1.
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acterized by the identical size No, the single-city optimum
size, among all cities. A higher (lower) degree of homo-
geneity associated with localization economies r and/or a
lower (higher) weighted average of the labor elasticities of
the industry subjective production functions Zaihi will in-
crease (decrease) No. It is also a stable equilibrium with
many cities in existence in the economy. In the two-city
framework, however, stability in equilibrium requires the
common city size be larger than No, thereby causing a slight
suboptimum compared to the theoretical optimum above. This
optimum is achieved totally by migration of factors and
absence of trade. Cities are identical in all aspects and
self-sufficient. This suggests that the common view that
optimum city systems would probably be hierarchical in size
such as the rank-size distribution (for example,
Richardson[1981]) may be mistaken.2
(b). For small and/or underdeveloped countries with a suffi-
ciently low level of urbanization so that the total urban
population is less than No, the optimum as well as equi-
2 Because scale economies differ among industries, Richardson
seems to argue, net urbanization economies (or what he calls
"agglomeration economies") are maximized at different city
sizes. He, therefore, implicitly assumes that the number and
composition of industries are necessarily different among
cities. Unless industrial activities or factors are geographi-
cally immobile, however, there is no reason why this must happen
under our general equilibrium framework. Henderson's similar
argument, on the other hand, is based on complete specialization
by cities in a single but different industry. The pitfalls of
his model were indicated in Chapter 2.
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librium city size distribution is characterized by the ex-
istence of a single city in the nation due to cumulative
migration. Because the level of welfare of the city is
still on the rising part of the curve with respect to city
size, the primary concern for such countries must be greater
urbanization and industrialization before any consideration
is taken into city size distribution.
If factor mobility is sufficiently low in such countries
so that existing city sizes can be regarded as fixed, a
trade equilibrium is feasible that offers gains from trade
over autarky albeit at different welfare levels between
cities. However, trade between small cities under scale
economies is generally characterized by low trade volume and
offers little improvement. Thus promoting greater factor
mobility under the circumstances, thereby helping to achieve
the single equilibrium city size, seems a lot more sensible
approach than, for example, investment in inter-urban trans-
portation systems that would presumably facilitate trade
rather than factor mobility. Similarly, insitu development
strategies aimed at the existing small cities and towns such
as the agropolitan development approach (Friedmann and
Weaver[1979]) would appear ineffective. 3
3 This is because spatial segregation of populations among cities
and towns rather than integration - be it "independent develop-
ment" or "protection from external exploitation" - is the main
motive of such strategies.
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(c). In the above situation (b), therefore, the existence of a
single large city or its dominance over smaller cities in
equilibrium must not be regarded as being of economic in-
efficiency. Although the city size distribution may appear
highly primate, the dominant city is still small in absolute
terms (i.e., less than No), and the equilibrium city size
distribution represents close to the optimum. This suggests
that relative primacy measures of city size distributions
such as the ratio-based primacy index, or its more elaborate
variants such as the one by El-Shakhs[1972], or the sta-
tistically-determined Pareto coefficient (see Rosen and
Resnick[1980]) all have inherent shortcomings in terms of
associating economic efficiency with city size distribu-
tions. Clearly there is a need to complement them with some
measures of absolute city sizes. 4
(d). The more general equilibrium city size distribution with
different sizes is obtained by our migration and trade
model, and it is characterized by the larger city being
greater than and the smaller city less than No within the
two-city framework. It is required that the combined sizes
be no less than 2No. This situation is thus likely to
emerge in countries which are larger in size and/or have a
4 For this matter, refer to Wheaton and Shishido[1981] and
Kwon[1982) among others.
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higher level of urbanization than those in (b). In equi-
librium, trade is balanced and welfare levels are equalized
between the two cities. This is in a sharp contrast with
the common central-place-based hierarchical models, notably
Beckmann and McPherson[1970] which is characterized by trade
imbalance and a functional presupposition between the
higher-order city size and its lower-order market areas.
It is to be noted that in order to arrive at this equi-
librium, trade is a precondition; otherwise, migration alone
would result in a distribution of identical city sizes as in
the above (a). It is in this sense that while the equi-
librium is stable with respect to trade, it is unstable with
respect to factor mobility. Although this equilibrium was
shown in Fig. 4-8 to be inferior to the optimum city size
distribution of (a), the almost universal occurrence of
hierarchical city size distributions in reality leads us to
suspect that factor mobility may not be as perfect as we
have assumed. It may also be speculated that trade is so
pervasive that migration occurs just enough to offset the
post-trade welfare differentials between cities.
(e). The equilibrium city size distribution in (d) seems to
closely reflect the current "primate" situation in many
countries in that the very fact of hierarchical city sizes
indicates a divergence from the optimum. Market outcomes
under limited facor mobility clearly entail economic in-
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efficiency, and a planned intervention that facilitates
greater factor mobility and movement toward the optimum is
consequently justified. Indeed, even a small difference in
size between the larger and smaller cities, although not
primate at all, must be indicative of economic inefficiency.
Again, we can easily find the fallacy of relative primacy
measures.
Within the confines of two cities in the nation, the
equilibrium situation gets worse and moves toward even
greater primacy as the national urban population increases.
However, the supposition is arbitrary and may exaggerate
reality especially in view of the fact that many countries
probably have national urban populations far greater than
2No. Within the framework of many cities and sufficiently
large urban populations, our model would instead predict an
equilibrium in which multiples of pairs of different-sized
trading cities exist. It is not difficult to envision that
this new equilibrium may probably be closer to the optimum
than the one under the two-city framework.
(f). It is well observed that with enough urbanization and/or
development, urban primacy eventually falls and the im-
portance of a city size distribution diminishes. And our
last observation in (e) seems to support this. 5 In connec-
5 For seminal works on this subject, see Berry[1961], and
Alonso[1968).
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tion with (d) and (e), however, for countries with not
enough overall urbanization and/or development, the problem
of urban primacy seems real and may indeed incur economic
costs. Countries like Egypt, Mexico, and Brazil in which
one or two large cities apper well beyond and other cities
well below No may belong to this group. Although further
migration into the large cities may eventually slow down as
the countries approch "lower level equilibrium points" in
city size distributions, the utility levels in both large
and small cities will deteriorate.
According to our model, a higher level equilibrium point
under trade can be achieved only when the small cities grow
larger in size but remain less than No. With the total na-
tional urban population fixed, this suggests that the
smaller cities must be fewer in number as well. This
suggestion seems in line with the paradigm of "concentrated
decentralization" advocated by Rodwin[1961], and
Alonso[1968], among others. Finally, the current near
monopoly by the big cities of localized noneconomic func-
tions, such as central government services and quality
higher education, undoubtedly seems to exacerbate the prim-
acy problem. To the extent that such functions also deter-
mine the welfare levels of other cities, redistribution of
them among all cities may seriously be considered.
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6. CONCLUSION
This dissertation has proposed a general equilibrium
approach to city size and output determination that integrates
and builds upon the supply- and demand-oriented approaches cur-
rently available. As such, some prominent but often overlooked
features of both approaches - agglomeration economies and dis-
economies of the former and interdependence among cities via
trade of the latter, for example, - have been retained in the new
approach. However, the allowance for multiple industries, or in-
dustrial diversity, in the city and for trade balance is unique
to our approach, and is deemed to be a theoretically more sound
and empirically more accurate rendition of reality.
While the new approach may find many uses in urban modelling
in general, our main objective with it has been to associate
economic efficiency with various city size distributions in the
nation. Given all the interdependence among cities, especially
via migration and trade, it has been argued, the current pre-
occupation with only the largest city and its size in national
planning must be redirected toward the whole spectrum of cities
of different sizes in the nation. This must be especially so
when the efficacy of the national planning is seriously taken
into account.
Based on the new approach, our single-city model has given
rise to the optimum city size at which net urbanization economies
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in autarky are maximized. With many cities in existence, it is
also an equilibrium size for all cities when the equilibrium is
achieved totally by migration among cities. The lack of such a
uniform and optimum city size distribution in reality, however,
has been attributed to the lack of complete factor mobility
and/or the pervasive nature of inter-urban trade. Our migration
and trade model has shown that with trade and migration occurring
simultaneously, an equilibrium city size distribution with diffe-
rent sizes can be obtained. This hierarchical city size dis-
tribution, both suboptimal and more realistic, is to be differ-
entiated from a similar result of some of the more restricted
demand-oriented approachs based on the presumed hierarchical
orders of goods as well as cities. Insightful policy impli-
cations follow the city size distribution and are delineated in
the last chapter.
Our general equilibrium approach, however, undoubtedly
suffers from important simplications of reality. In particular,
the specification of localization economies as the sole component
of urbanization economies considerably simplifies both the scope
and nature of urbanization economies. The assumption of full
employment, coupled with the lack of consideration of rural
areas, may significantly limit the use of our approach in many
developing countries with high rates of rural-urban migration.
It is hoped that further research with greater realism could
extend our approach.
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